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The Power of Silence: Impunity and Accountability in Lebanon 
 
Michelle M. Bouchebel 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Power of Silence: Impunity and Accountability in Lebanon by Michelle Bouchebel 
explores the extent to which transitional justice mechanisms could help to strengthen 
accountability and the rule of law in Lebanon and suggests several options for the kinds 
of transitional justice mechanisms that could be explored, taking into account the current 
political context of the country. 
 
The study draws on, and seeks to contribute to, literature on transitional justice as well 
as literature on the Lebanese civil war and its aftermath. In an effort to assess the 
feasibility of implementing transitional justice mechanisms in Lebanon, the study 
develops four criteria: political feasibility, impact on rule of law, economic viability and 
potential for quick wins. Applying these criteria, the study argues that judicial reform 
targeting the independence of the judiciary; security sector reform targeting the behavior 
and mindsets of both the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces, and 
adopting a bottom-up, civil society-led informal truth process, could be expected to 
produce some tangible results in the short to medium-term. It further argues that their 
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real importance lies in the normative change they would bring to Lebanese politics with 
regard to dealing with the past: towards a more just and more equal society and away 
from a culture of kleptocracy and muhasasa which have dominated the post-war 
reconstruction and reform efforts in the country. 
 
Keywords: Transitional Justice; Rule of Law; Impunity; Accountability; Corruption; 
Lebanon. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
―We should not forget the war, but we should also not become its prisoners, 
nor should we impose it on the new generation. Today’s youth have a right to forget and 
we have a right to remember. I am concerned that they will make the same mistakes 
because we have not studied all of the war’s consequences. Perhaps we abandoned this 
more quickly than what was needed.‖  
—Ghassan Salame (Barak, 2007, p.49) 
Wars usually have a start date and an end date, but the suffering of the people who have 
been directly or indirectly affected endures long beyond a conflict‘s timeline. During 
times of war, mass human rights violations occur and their consequences affect not only 
the victims themselves, but also tend to be transferred onto subsequent generations. 
People who are physically, sexually, morally and economically abused, abducted, 
displaced, kidnapped, disappeared and even killed, have rights considered by 
international law to be universal, which must be respected by their governments. 
The consequences of wars do not only affect victims, on the contrary, they spill over to 
the society and country as a whole, often destroying a country‘s entire infrastructure. In 
the aftermath of a conflict, war-torn societies can be faced with shattered state 
institutions, depleted resources, minimal levels of security, if any, and a divided and 
distressed population. The absence of oversight over state institutions often also leads to 
corruption and the embezzlement of resources. If the judiciary is weakened or 
undermined, then a culture of impunity prevails and laws are no longer obeyed or 
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enforced. This, in turn, amplifies mistrust in the government and structures of state, and 
leads to the absence of the rule of law (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], The 
rule of Law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 2004). 
In the post-conflict period, significant attention is often given to repairing the material 
damage caused by war – rebuilding houses, roads, schools, hospitals and other essential 
infrastructure – and to demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating former combatants into 
productive employment. These measures may be sufficient for rebuilding a state, but are 
they sufficient for rebuilding society? Can they provide answers to questions such as: 
How to deal with the violent past? How to deal with the consequences of war and the 
atrocities committed during war in a way that would facilitate rebuilding an inclusive, 
democratic state? How to deal with the perpetrators of atrocities? How to safeguard the 
rights of the victims of conflicts and compensate for their emotional and material losses? 
How to reconcile between conflicting parties in a sustainable manner? Who are to be 
held accountable and by whom? How to rebuild respect for the rule of law and public 
confidence in the government and state institutions? How does transition happen? 
The short answer is no, they cannot. This seems to have been also the conclusion of the 
international community, inasmuch as with the end of the Cold War and the growing 
number of intra-state conflicts (as opposed to the inter-state conflicts which had 
constituted the majority of conflicts in the past), a new field of study was created to deal 
with the ―full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society‘s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
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serve justice and achieve reconciliation‖ (UNSC, 2004, art. 8). That field of study is 
transitional justice. 
The concept of transitional justice can be defined as ―an umbrella term that covers a 
range of disparate practices to address a violent past in a period of regime transition‖ 
(Barahona De Brito, 2010, p.360). It gained more prominence in literature in the late 
1980s as a result of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, 
notorious for their systematic human rights abuses, being replaced by democratic ones 
(InternationaL Center for Transitiona Justice [ICTJ], 2013). In 1988, a group of scholars 
and activists from Argentina, Uganda, Chile, South Africa, South Korea, Philippines, 
Uruguay, Guatemala, Haiti and Brazil, all countries that were going through political 
transitions, gathered at a conference organized by the Aspen Institute and had one 
common question: ―what to do with the former torturers persisting in their midst‖ 
(Arthur, 2009, p.322). They shared their experiences and concerns regarding the ethical, 
legal and practical dilemmas facing human rights activists with regard to how to deal 
with past abuses without compromising the political transitions – questions that were 
hard to answer at that time. This conference was the first of a series of meetings that 
solidified and clarified the conceptual framework of this emerging field. Over the years, 
and with the help of a vast pool of human rights activists, legal experts and scholars, the 
concept of transitional justice emerged as a discipline at the international level and was 
acknowledged for its comparative knowledge base. (Arthur, 2009) 
According to a key 2004 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) report on the rule of 
law and transitional justice, consolidating peace in post-conflict societies and preserving 
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it in the long run is only possible if ―the population is confident that redress for 
grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and the fair administration of justice‖ (UNSC, 2004, art.2). The report also 
maintains that the intensified vulnerability of ―minorities, women, children, prisoners 
and detainees, displaced persons, refugees and others, which is evident in all conflict and 
post-conflict situations, brings an element of urgency to the imperative of restoration of 
the rule of law‖ (UNSC, 2004, art. 2). In order to consolidate peace, citizens need to feel 
that they have access to justice and that perpetrators have been held accountable. Justice 
is seen as essential for consolidating the rule of law. 
It would seem, therefore, that transitional justice can offer an approach and a set of 
mechanisms to help countries recovering from internal conflict or political transition in 
building a society that is just and acknowledges the suffering of the victims of past 
atrocities. This would be essential for instilling a sense of justice in society, which in 
turn is essential for consolidating the rule of law, a pillar of society which ―ensures 
political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability [that] affirm the 
political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power‖ 
(O'Donnell, 2004, p.32).  
The combination of justice and the rule of law are therefore very much connected to 
long-term peace and stability: the United Nations (UN) considers that these three 
together form the key components of the international community‘s efforts to improve 
human rights, optimize economic development and promote accountability and good 
governance (UNSC, 2004). 
5 
 
Among the countries that emerged from a bloody civil war in the immediate post-Cold 
War period is Lebanon. Unlike many other countries recovering from intra-state conflict 
at that time, Lebanon did not undergo a transitional justice process in the aftermath of its 
war, but rather took the decision not to deal with its past, with atrocities committed or 
with the suffering of the victims.  
According to the Freedom in the World 2014 report by Freedom House, Lebanon is 
partly free with a score of 48 out of 100 (Freedom House, 2014); according to the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, Lebanon scored 28 – 
two points lower than in 2012 – and ranked 127 out of 175 countries examined 
(Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, 2013), and; according 
to the 2012 Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project, Lebanon has an average 
rank of 59 out of 97 countries examined across the 8 factors of Rule of Law it examines 
(World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index 2012-2013, 2013). It would seem, 
therefore, that the current status of Lebanon leaves much to be desired in terms of the 
political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability called for by O‘Donnel 
above. 
Building on the above, the main research question of this thesis is: could transitional 
justice help to strengthen accountability and the rule of law in Lebanon, and if so, what 
might feasible transitional justice processes in Lebanon look like?  
This study draws on, and seeks to contribute to, two main bodies of literature. On the 
one hand, it draws on literature on transitional justice and seeks to contribute to it by 
looking at the consequences of post-war settlements on impunity and accountability. On 
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the other, it will draw on literature on the Lebanese civil war and its aftermath and seek 
to contribute to it by analyzing the societal and institutional consequences of impunity in 
the Lebanese context and establishing the opportunities and limitations of a transitional 
justice approach in Lebanon. 
The body of literature on transitional justice and its mechanisms has been expanding and 
maturing in parallel with this field‘s development over the last thirty years. This paper 
draws on the theoretical work done by scholars such as Ruti Teitel, who has focused in 
particular on the relationship between transitional justice and the rule of law, and Neil 
Kritz, who has also studied the experiences of different countries in implementing 
transitional justice mechanisms such as vetting or purge, truth seeking, prosecutions and 
amnesties. The study has been inspired by more recent work by Ruben Carranza, which 
has made a strong case for expanding the traditional scope of transitional justice to 
include also corruption and economic crimes.  
With regard to transitional justice in the Balkans, the work of Jelena Subotić in 
―Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans‖, has been instrumental for 
studying criminal justice and its application especially in Croatia. As for literature on the 
case of Lebanon, this paper has drawn upon the work of a number of scholars writing 
about the causes of war, the post war settlement and its consequences. In his book ―Civil 
and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon‖, Samir Khalaf examines the historical role that 
international and regional actors have played in de-stabilizing Lebanon. In ―Spoils of 
Truth‖, Reinoud Leenders looks into the consequences of the post-war settlements by 
highlighting corruption and its impact on state-building. In terms of transitional justice, 
7 
 
the work of Nizar Saghieh, Sune Haugbolle and Aida Kanafi-Zahar gives a critical 
insight on the efforts that took place in Lebanon after the war. 
By building on the work of these academics as well as looking into primary sources such 
as the Taif accord and the Amnesty law, this study hopes to invigorate the debate on 
transitional justice in Lebanon. The importance of this paper is twofold: first, it studies 
the impact of transitional justice on the rule of law and second, it draws on comparative 
experiences, good practices and lessons learned from other countries in an effort to 
identify politically feasible transitional justice measures that could enhance the rule of 
law and accountability in Lebanon.  
Chapter 2 will start by defining transitional justice and the rule of law and exploring in 
more detail the link between the two. It will seek to demonstrate that transitional justice 
mechanisms are an effective tool for strengthening the rule of law in countries 
experiencing transition or recovering from conflict. Chapter 3 will then examine the case 
of Croatia as a relevant comparator for Lebanon and consider whether transitional 
justice mechanisms employed in Croatia, as well as the ―carrots and sticks‖ used to 
implement them, could be relevant also in the Lebanese context. Chapter 4 will provide 
a brief introduction into the kinds of human rights violations that took place during the 
Lebanese civil war and its aftermath, in an effort to establish what measures were taken 
in Lebanon to address these and to rebuild society, why, and what impact they have had 
on the rule of law. The argument will be made that instead of introducing reforms aimed 
at strengthening the ability of state institutions to uphold the rule of law and revive the 
country, reforms were limited to revitalizing the economy and were notorious for the 
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high levels of corruption involved, which actually had a negative impact on the rule of 
law in Lebanon. Finally, Chapter 5 will develop a set of criteria for assessing the 
feasibility of different transitional justice mechanisms and processes that could be 
implemented to improve the rule of law in the prevailing Lebanese context. 
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Chapter Two 
Transitional Justice, the Rule of Law and 
Democracy 
―In the past, peace and justice were presented as mutually incompatible goals. 
The dilemma was thought to be between securing peace with the cooperation of 
perpetrators of human rights violations or addressing justice at the cost of perpetuating 
conflict. In recent years, however, this perceived tension between peace and justice has 
been gradually dissolving. There has been a growing recognition that, when properly 
pursued, peace and justice can promote and sustain each other. Indeed, peace and 
justice are increasingly—and rightly—seen as inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing. 
The persisting dilemma concerns rather the extent of national mechanisms’ ability and 
determination to bring the alleged perpetrators of international crimes to justice.‖ 
—Navanethem Pillay, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (Pillay, 2009, para.3) 
It has often been postulated that seeking justice through trials after mass atrocities 
hinders the peace process and reconciliation between conflicting parties
1
. In some cases 
it is also advised to turn the page, forget about the past and start a fresh new beginning, 
such as in the case of Lebanon
2
. However, by forgetting about the past and wiping clean 
the slates of those who took active part in atrocities, the voice of the innocents also goes 
unheard and their suffering is perpetuated. Those who usually suffer the most from such 
conflicts are the ―civilians‖ who end up paying the price for the ambitions, mistakes and 
profit seeking of those in power. So how can we talk about peace and reconciliation 
when the people who were affected the most by conflict are forgotten? We would do 
                                               
1
 See (Amstutz, 2005, p.10); (Kritz, 1995, p. xxi-xxii); (Huntington, 1995, p.69)  
2
 See (Haugbølle, 2012); (Germanos & Germanos, 2012) 
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well to recall the words of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, that peace and 
justice go hand in hand and reinforce each other. If you want to have a peaceful nation, 
give its citizens justice so that they are able to reconcile with their past. Finding 
mechanisms and processes that would facilitate such reconciliation is what transitional 
justice tries to achieve (Pillay, 2009). 
This chapter will begin by defining the concept of transitional justice and examining its 
evolution in academic discourse. It will further break down transitional justice into its 
commonly accepted sub-categories in an effort to assess what mechanisms they can 
offer to countries seeking to come to terms with their past. Finally, the chapter will 
consider the interrelationship between transitional justice and the rule of law, and argue 
that for post-conflict societies, engaging in transitional justice efforts is a means to 
strengthen the rule of law.   
2.1. What is Transitional Justice? 
There are two approaches that can help in dealing with the past, ―engagement or denial, 
accountability or avoidance‖ (Amstutz, 2005, p.8). Transitional justice is based on the 
concept of engagement, which entails that ―before nations can be healed or reconciled, 
regime wrongdoings must be disclosed and acknowledged and then redressed through 
appropriate strategies of accountability‖ (Amstutz, 2005, p.8). How to deal with the 
transition from a bloody past, that left thousands of victims and shattered a country, to a 
new democratic system is not a new question, Ruti Teitel traces the first examples of 
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such considerations back to the ―Nuremberg Trials‖ of 1945, where the Allied forces 
prosecuted elite members of the Nazi German Regime (Teitel, 2000).   
However, it wasn't until the late 1980s and early 1990s that transitional justice emerged 
as a specific field of study. This is largely due to the fact that with the end of the Cold 
War, a number of countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe transitioned from 
various kinds of authoritarian regimes, often created and maintained by the ideological 
struggle between the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union, towards 
democracy, resulting in the so-called "third wave of democratization"(Huntington, 
1995). According to Paige Arthur, it was the particular context of this third wave 
of democratization that established the need for a concept that would ―signal a new sort 
of human rights activity and [as] a response to concrete political dilemmas human rights 
activists faced in what they understood to be transitional contexts.‖  (Arthur, 2009, 
p.326).   
In its early stages, the concept of ―transitional justice‖ was not very well developed or 
defined. It was widely used by Ruti Teitel in the early 90s and soon after by Neil Kritz, 
who published a three volume collection entitled: ―Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes‖ in 1995. At that time, the term transitional 
justice was exclusively used to refer to a process assumed by nascent democracies 
that went through a change in their political system and needed mechanisms and 
processes to deal with the injustices of past authoritarian regimes. Some of the 
reviewers of Krtiz‘s book, such as Richard Siegel, argued that transitional justice 
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―characterized the choice made and quality rendered when new leaders replace 
authoritarian predecessors presumed responsible for criminal acts in the wake of the 
‗third wave of democratization‘‖ (Arthur, 2009, p.331). 
Partly due to the political context of the post-Cold War world, transitional justice was 
initially conceptualized as an approach to dealing with political transition specifically, 
rather than post-conflict situations more broadly. However, it was soon recognized that 
the kinds of mechanisms and processes that can help national reconciliation and bring 
perpetrators of past violations to justice can be helpful in a broader range of contexts 
than simply transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones.  
In 1997, Louis Joinet presented a report to the UN sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in which he tackled the question of 
―impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations‖, which was becoming a growing 
concern in the eyes of the international community. While the report did not specifically 
relate this term to transitional justice, it nevertheless articulated the guiding principles 
for developing the rights of victims through three sets of principles known as the ―Joinet 
principles‖. These principles – the victim‘s right to know, right to justice, and right to 
reparations (Joinet,1997, p. 5) – were soon thereafter adopted by transitional justice 
scholars and practitioners, and in 2004 the UN adopted an official definition of 
transitional justice as the ―full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation‖ (UNSC, 2004, p.4).  
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Since 2004, thinkers such as Naomi Roht-Arriaza, who argues that transitional justice 
should not be limited to political and civil rights, but instead should cover the full 
spectrum of human rights, have further enriched this definition. Roht-Arriaza goes on to 
propose a definition of transitional justice as a ―set of practices, mechanisms and 
concerns that arise following a period of conflict, civil strife or repression, and that are 
aimed directly at confronting and dealing with past violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law‖ (Sandoval, 2011, p.3).  It is in this context that transitional justice 
can also be considered relevant for the case of post-war Lebanon, where a 15-year 
conflict took place from 1975 to 1990 but did not lead to regime change, which means 
that the status quo remained the same and the war-time leaders or warlords are still 
governing the country today.   
2.2.  The Five Pillars of Transitional Justice  
Transitional justice processes and mechanisms are supposed to empower the victims of 
human rights violations and give them a voice. By so doing, they can help to ensure that 
the suffering of victims does not go unheard and that all possible measures are taken to 
attempt to prevent the recurrence of violence. This is why the literature on transitional 
justice, including the recommendations given by the UN, emphasizes the importance of 
engaging those most affected, in other words the victims or their families, in every 
process. 
Transitional justice is commonly understood as a range of judicial and non-judicial 
measures and mechanisms, which, since it is a relatively young field of study, are still 
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developing and evolving. The UN considers transitional justice to rest on five main 
pillars: 1) criminal prosecutions; 2) truth-seeking; 3) reparations; 4) institutional 
reforms; 5) vetting and dismissals (UNSC, 2004, para.8). The International Center for 
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), one of the leading NGOs in the field of transitional justice, 
groups vetting and dismissals under institutional reform and thus identifies four key 
pillars instead of five, which are criminal prosecutions, truth-seeking, reparations and 
institutional reform (ICTJ, 2013). Regardless of the specific terminology used to 
describe the core elements or pillars of transitional justice, it is broadly agreed that these 
elements are interrelated processes that strengthen each other and should not be dealt 
with in isolation from each other (ICTJ, 2013).  
For the purposes of this study, the five pillars identified by the UN will be used as the 
framework for examining whether and how the different pillars of transitional justice 
could help strengthen democracy and the rule of law in Lebanon. In order to assess the 
relevance of these different pillars or elements to the Lebanese context, the study will 
examine each pillar in more detail. 
2.2.1. Criminal Prosecutions 
Criminal prosecutions aim at holding the perpetrators of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and gross violations of international human rights law 
accountable by bringing them to justice (UN, 2010, p.7). The thinking behind this 
mechanism is that the people who are responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide 
and war crimes should be tried ―in accordance with international standards of fair trial‖ 
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(UN, 2010, p.7) and if convicted, they should be sentenced for the crimes and violations 
that they committed, as opposed to simply being granted amnesty on the one hand (as 
was the case in post-Franco Spain for example) or executed without trial out of 
vengeance on the other (as was done to Muammar Gaddafi in Libya recently). One of 
the main arguments in support of this approach is that under international law, states are 
obliged to ―investigate, prosecute and punish such crimes‖ (Sandoval, 2011, p.4). 
Another argument is that holding the perpetrators accountable deters future 
atrocities from being committed and helps in fighting impunity (Huntington, 1995, 
p.68).   
The UN encourages trials to be mainly under the domestic jurisdiction of the state whose 
nationals are on trial. This is because domestic trials for human rights violations have a 
more powerful impact from the point of view of reinforcing a sense of justice; as Kim 
and Sikkink argue, ―domestic prosecution and punishment inhibit individual criminal 
activity in the country where the prosecution occurs‖ (Kim & Sikkink, 2007, p.7), thus 
serving as a deterrent to further lawlessness in countries suffering from weak rule of law 
to begin with. Several examples of successful domestic trials can be found in countries 
in Latin America, such as Argentina where Alfredo Astiz, a Commander during the 
military rule of Videla from 1976 to 1983 was domestically tried. Astiz, known as ―El 
Ángel Rubio de la Muerte‖ or ―The Blond Angel of Death‖ was prosecuted and found 
guilty of crimes against humanity on October 27, 2011 (Mattes, 2012).  
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Some post-conflict countries lack the legal capacity and/or political will to establish 
national tribunals. In these cases, ‗hybrid tribunals‘ have proved to be a workable 
alternative. Hybrid tribunals are composed of a mix of domestic and international justice 
actors and are known for blending ―the international and the domestic as a product of 
judicial accountability-sharing between the states in which they function and 
international entities‖ (Holvoet & De Hert, 2012, p.229). Hybrid courts are able to 
exercise domestic justice while upholding international law and complying with relevant 
international standards and are usually jointly set up by the State and the United Nations, 
such as in the case of The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), to name a few.  Many scholars consider that such tribunals, 
which combine domestic and international judges, can reach a higher level of legitimacy 
than purely international courts. This is due to the fact that they can deliver ownership 
without compromising on independence and impartiality (Holvoet & De Hert, 2012, 
p.230). In other words, they are able to prosecute more perpetrators in less time and at a 
lower cost, but at the same time they also help build capacity at the national level. These 
trials are funded by voluntary funds from governments, for example the court of Sierra 
Leone received funds from over 40 states as well as some financial support from the UN 
(The Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2011). In September 2013, this tribunal 
successfully sentenced the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, for 50 years ―for 
encouraging rebels in Sierra Leone to mutilate, rape and murder victims in its civil war‖ 
(Reuters, 2013, para.1).  
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Ad hoc tribunals, also known as international tribunals, are another type of international 
court that is occasionally set up by the UN Security Council ―under its biding powers‖ 
specifically to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocides. As a response to the atrocities that were committed after the end of the cold 
war in Former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, the international community intervened and 
the UN set up the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). What distinguishes these 
two tribunals from the rest is that they have ―compulsory jurisdiction with primacy over 
domestic State courts‖ (Garraway, 2011, para.6) – in other words they are not reliant on 
domestic legislation or judges to accomplish their work. Both of these tribunals were 
established because the situation is the two countries was considered as ―a threat to 
international peace and security‖ and the international community was ―determined to 
put an end to such crimes and [...] to bring to justice the persons who are responsible for 
them‖ (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1993, para.1). These types of trials are 
often criticized for opting to resort to international jurisdiction at the expense of 
strengthening domestic legitimacy; Jose Alvarez, one of the main critics of the ICTR 
notes that ―by depriving the Rwandan government of the opportunity to try high-level 
perpetrators, the ICTR‘s primacy deprived the current government of legitimacy at a 
critical time‖ (Raub, 2009, p.1019).  
In addition to the above-mentioned courts, which are specifically established to deal 
with crimes committed in a particular context, there is the possibility of referring 
violations of human rights to the International Criminal Court (ICC), as its work begins 
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when ―States are unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute themselves‖ 
(United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [UNOHCHR], 
2006, p.1). The ICC‘s jurisdiction is quite limited, however, since it only has jurisdiction 
if the state in question has signed the Rome Statute
3
, if the states specifically asks for the 
Courts‘s assistance or if the UN Security Council refers a case to it. Furthermore, it can 
only cover violations that took place after July 2002 (UNOHCHR, 2006, p.1).  
Indeed, it would seem that recent developments in the field of international criminal law 
and human rights law have placed considerable weight on upholding justice; through 
different types of tribunals, the international community has sought to ensure that  
serious violations of human rights law do not go unnoticed and unpunished. Building on 
existing international human rights conventions, such as the UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 
1984, the international community has sought to develop the necessary public and 
customary international law to establish an international obligation to intervene in areas 
where such violations have taken place (Sandoval, 2011, p.4). Different kinds of 
tribunals, combined with normative developments made by initiatives such as the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, have gone a long way 
to establish the right of the international community to take action and ―ensure that 
justice is done‖ (Sandoval, 2011, p.3) in situations where a state is not able or willing to 
                                               
3 The Rome Statute is the founding treaty of the International Criminal Tribunal and outlines its 
jurisdiction and mandate. The text of this treaty can be found at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf 
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carry out its international obligations to hold accountable the perpetrators of human 
rights violations under its jurisdiction.  
Despite these developments, the ‗peace vs. justice‘ debate still dominates much of the 
discussion among practitioners: that is, the question of whether seeking justice hinders 
the ability to establish peace. Some countries, such as Brazil, have chosen to settle for 
peace at the expense of justice. In 2010, the Brazilian Supreme Court insisted that in 
order to maintain peace, an amnesty law had to be introduced through a social 
agreement. Other countries such as Columbia, Chile and Argentina, on the other hand, 
have continued to fight the impunity created by amnesia and have opted for domestic 
trials. (Sandoval, 2011, p.4)  
While it is perhaps too early to determine whether, in the long run, seeking justice tends 
to strengthen peace or hinder it, many scholars and practitioners alike seem to be moving 
towards favouring justice over amnesty. A recent study completed in 2007 by Kim and 
Sikkink, entitled ―Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for 
Transitional Countries‖, shows that in general, these trials improve the protection of 
human rights in transitioning countries and can even extend this effect to 
neighboring countries (Kim & Sikkink, 2007).  From a UN point of view ―Amnesties 
are impermissible if they prevent prosecution of individuals who may be criminally 
responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of 
human rights‖ (Pillay, 2009, para.3). Navi Pillay, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, reinforces this argument by stating ―there are also 
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indications that in countries where amnesties for serious crimes are allowed, a 
corresponding culture of immunity has emerged. This, in turn, exacerbated human rights 
violations‖ (Pillay, 2009, para.3).  
2.2.2. Truth Seeking  
Truth Seeking constitutes the second pillar of transitional justice, as identified by the 
UN. It aims at investigating and reporting on systematic patterns of abuses through truth 
commissions, which can be official state bodies or unofficial commissions that help 
understand the patterns of violations and come up with recommendations to 
redress violations and prevent their recurrences (UNSC, 2004) (ICTJ, 2013). 
Although it does not require judicial measures in the way pursuing actual criminal 
justice does, it can nevertheless ―positively complement criminal tribunals‖ (UNSC, 
2004, para. 26).   
Much of the literature on transitional justice considers truth seeking to be a foundation 
for a wider strategy to reach accountability. According to Amstutz, ―the foundation of 
any strategy of accountability is the discovery, disclosure, and acknowledgment of truth‖ 
(Amstutz, 2005, p. 8). Amstutz goes on to argue that the truth should be public and that 
the people should know of the atrocities that were committed by the state or particular 
organizations or groups within the state. This argument is further reinforced by various 
UN conventions. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions focuses on the right of the 
families of missing persons to know what happened to their beloved and thereby 
―establishes the obligations to be fulfilled by each party to the conflict‖ (Sandoval, 2011, 
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p.8). The UN Convention on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearances, in turn, establishes ―the right of victims to know the truth regarding the 
circumstances of the enforced disappearance, the progress and results of the 
investigation and the fate of the disappeared person‖ (Sandoval, 2011, p.8).  
Truth seeking is usually done through either official truth commissions or unofficial 
truth commissions, also known as unofficial truth projects. Official truth commissions 
are established by the state and are known to be ―nonjudicial bodies of a limited duration 
established to determine facts, causes and consequences of past human rights violations‖ 
(Gonzalez & Varney, 2013, p.9). Such commissions serve to highlight the testimonies of 
victims, which provide them with recognition of the wrongdoings done to them. Given 
the interdependent nature of different transitional justice mechanisms, these 
commissions can also help in the prosecution and reparation processes by gathering data 
and providing recommendations, which can help determine what kind of institutional 
reforms would be needed to deter future violations. In short, the outcomes of official 
truth commissions help ―societies to overcome a culture of silence and distrust‖ 
(Gonzalez & Varney, 2013, p.9). An example of a ―government-appointed commission‖ 
is South Africa‘s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was established 
by the government to find the truth and deal with the violations that took place during 
Apartheid (Amstutz, 2005, p.9).  This commission was able to collect over 22,000 
testimonies, organize public hearings and produce a report of 3,500 pages that set the 
record straight with regard to the memory of South Africa during its transition. Given its 
public tenure, it allowed victims to be involved in ―amnesty proceedings where 
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perpetrators confessed their crimes‖, which contributed to the reconciliation and healing 
process of the society (Gonzalez & Varney, 2013, p.12). The work of the TRC was 
nevertheless criticized as the government was unable to implement the recommendations 
given by this commission and the commission‘s work focused exclusively on individual 
crimes whereas it was felt that ―the ‗excesses‘ of the apartheid regime came at the cost 
of largely ignoring the institutional violence that characterised National Party rule for 
over four decades‖ (Valji, 2003, para.3).  
Unofficial truth commissions basically share the same objectives of an official truth 
commission in the sense that they are ―geared towards revealing the truth about crimes 
committed in the past as a component of a broader strategy of accountability and justice‖ 
(Bickford, 2007, p. 994). What differentiates them from the official ones is that they are 
generally led by civil society and are not established by the government, which means 
that they do not have the authority to implement their recommendations and take 
decisions with regard to issues such as granting amnesty, prosecuting criminals, or 
providing reparations.    One of the many examples of such efforts is the ―Brazil: Nunca 
Mais‖ known as ―Brazil: Never Again‖, which was part of a truth-telling initiative that 
was intended at presenting indisputable documentation of the systematic violence by the 
Brazilian government which lasted for around 20 years. The fruit of this initiative was 
the publication of a report on the abuses that was disseminated all over the country 
(Bickford, 2007, p. 1005).   
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In sum, truth-telling or truth-seeking efforts are essential for acknowledging the 
malpractices of the past. They might not always lead to justice and to reconciliation, 
but they are, as Jose Zalaquett puts it, ―an inescapable imperative‖ (Amstutz, 2005, p.9) 
in seeking those important goals.  
2.2.3. Reparations  
Under international law, victims have the right to a remedy; this is upheld by the ―UN 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law‖ (Magarrell, 2007, p.1).  Reparation efforts, which are state-
sponsored mechanisms by which governments acknowledge past violations and set up 
compensation initiatives for the victims, can be either symbolical in the form of an 
official apology or physical in the form of financial compensations, for example. 
According to Ruti Teitel, ―the vocabulary of reparatory justice illustrates its multiple 
dimensions, comprehending numerous diverse forms: reparations, damages, remedies, 
redress, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, tribute‖ (Teitel, 2000, p.119).   
What characterizes reparations is that it sheds light on the victims and their situation and 
establishes these as central to seeking transitional justice. It aims to redress the 
wrongdoings and the harm suffered by victims and tries to restore their dignity. 
Given its complex nature, this mechanism is faced with many challenges. For example, 
how can one put a price on the harm inflicted to a person who has lost all of their family 
members, their house and their property? Who should be eligible to benefit from 
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reparations? How can a transitioning state, which often is on the verge of being 
bankrupt, afford these reparations? In a situation like Rwanda, where almost 10% of the 
population was killed in a month, should only those who died be considered victims or 
also their families?  
One approach to tackling some of these challenges can be found in Peru, where the 
government developed an administrative reparation program that divided the victims and 
their family members according to classes or categories such as victims or family 
members of victims of disappearances, forcibly displaced, child soldiers, those who 
suffered rape, torture, etc. This policy has been considered to be more effective than 
treating violations on a case-by-case basis, as it reached a greater number of victims 
(Magarrell, 2007, p.4).    
According to Magarrell, the symbolic forms of reparation can include an official 
apology by the state or the perpetrators, ―the naming of a street in honor of a victim 
through to locating the remains of loved ones; creating dignified burial sites; 
establishing rehabilitation and community centers; releasing pools of credit or directly 
funding targeted community reparations projects; or paying compensation or pensions‖ 
(Magarrell, 2007, p.4). Physical forms of reparations typically take the form of material 
compensation, pensions and restoration of property rights (UNSC, 2004, para. 54). 
Symbolic and physical forms of reparation measures are often interdependent and 
particularly effective at rebuilding public trust in the state and at reintegrating victims 
back into society. For instance, the Chilean President Aylwin not only presented a public 
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apology for the violations committed by his predecessor General Pinochet, but also 
committed to give a pension to the families of the victims that were hurt by Pinochet‘s 
regime (Magarrell, 2007). It was only through this combination of an apology and the 
payment of a pension that this effort made sense to the public; otherwise the apology by 
itself would have been void.  
It is worth noting that reparation efforts do not always satisfy the victims who suffered 
an intolerable amount of abuse, and are far from perfect and flawless, but they are 
nevertheless widely considered necessary for rebuilding trust in a democratic state 
that at least acknowledges the harm that was inflicted upon its citizens (UNSC, 
2004).  
2.2.4. Institutional Reform  
The fourth pillar of transitional justice, institutional reform, is geared towards preventing 
the recurrence of violence and atrocities committed. Prevention of such acts cannot be 
achieved solely through the means of consoling the victims and punishing the 
perpetrators, but necessarily must also address and reform the system and structures 
that allowed these violations to occur in the first place. 
The security sector (SSR) is often the main focus of such reforms, which the UN defines 
as targeting ―the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, 
provision and oversight of security in a country‖ (United Nations General Assembly 
Security Council [UNGASC], 2008, p.5). In other words, such reform generally targets 
the military, the police, ―intelligence services, customs, certain segments of the justice 
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sector, and non-state actors with security functions‖ (Sandoval, 2011, p. 9). In fact, 
Sandoval makes a convincing argument for why the justice sector should also be 
incorporated in this mechanism, as it is primordial in bringing the perpetrators to justice 
and holding them accountable.  It is difficult, for example, to try criminals in courts if 
the judicial system is fragile and corrupted, as such situations tend to lead to impunity. 
Through a proper institutional reform program, public trust can be restored in 
government institutions, the security sector as well as the judicial system.  
2.2.5. Vetting and Dismissals 
Although vetting and purges are defined as a transitional justice mechanism by itself, 
they are often incorporated into institutional reform. Vetting is considered to consist of 
―processes for assessing an individual‘s integrity as a means for determining his or her 
suitability for public employment‖ (Sandoval, 2011, p.10). The targets of such processes 
are usually individuals in the public sphere who were responsible for past human rights 
abuses. Following the rule of law, not every individual who worked for an unjust regime 
or was affiliated with parties responsible of human rights abuses in the past should be 
automatically removed from their post. In order to ensure a proper accountability 
process, evidence should be presented of the wrongdoings of civil servants, for example, 
before letting them go. Failure to do so could lead not only to the collapse of state 
institutions due to lack of qualified individuals with experience in fulfilling necessary 
tasks, but also more generally to questioning the emerging democracy itself (Kritz, 1995, 
p. xxiv).  
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2.2.6. Transitional Justice beyond Established Mechanisms 
In addition to the five established pillars of transitional justice outlined above, an 
emerging element of transitional justice, which is considered to be relevant for this 
study, relates to dealing with the economic crimes and corruption committed by former 
warlords. According to Ruben Carranza, transitional justice has traditionally focused 
exclusively on violations of political and civil rights, at the expense of economic rights. 
He argues that ―corruption and human rights violations are mutually reinforcing forms 
of abuse‖ and that the current transitional justice culture ―perpetuates an impunity gap 
by focusing on a narrow range of human rights violations while leaving accountability 
for economic crimes to ineffective domestic institutions or to a still evolving 
international legal system that deals with corruption‖ (Carranza, 2008, p. 310).  
It is internationally recognized that there is a clear connection between accountability for 
economic crimes and respect for human rights; for instance, Transparency International 
highlights that ―a corrupt government which rejects both transparency and accountability 
is not likely to be a respecter of human rights. Therefore, the campaign to contain 
corruption and the movement for the promotion and protection of human rights are not 
disparate processes. They are inextricably linked and interdependent‖ (Carranza, 2008, 
p.311). In Nigeria, after the death of its former dictator, General Sani Abacha, it was not 
considered possible to hold him accountable for the embezzlement committed during his 
reign. As a consequence, his family still enjoys their illegal wealth and uses it to 
influence the current political regime in the country (Carranza, 2008, p.312).  
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This and numerous similar cases clearly illustrate the potentially serious consequences 
that an impunity gap, created when people responsible for serious economic crimes are 
not held accountable in the same way those responsible for serious human rights 
violations are, can have on national transition. Indeed, the importance given to freezing 
the assets of former dictators and developing mechanisms through which emerging 
democratic regimes could reclaim those assets provide clear evidence of the rising 
importance of addressing economic crimes in the eyes of the international community. 
This has been reinforced in Chapter V of the UN Convention against Corruption which 
highlights that financial institutions need to ―take reasonable steps to determine the 
identity of beneficial owners of funds deposited into high-value accounts and to conduct 
enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or on behalf of individuals who 
are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public functions and their family members 
and close associates‖ (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODOC], 2004, 
article 50 (1)).  
2.3. Why Transitional Justice Matters: A Case for the Rule of 
Law 
The aim of this study is not to engage in another analysis of whether or not transitional 
justice is necessary for achieving transition from violent conflict to stable democracy in 
a comprehensive sense, but rather to examine whether or not transitional justice could 
help to strengthen accountability and the rule of law specifically. This is because rule of 
law is essential for establishing genuine democracy as well as a requirement for 
restoring accountability and fighting impunity. In order to examine the relationship 
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between the five pillars of transitional justice outlined above and the rule of law, it is 
first necessary to establish an understanding of what constitutes the rule of law.  
The UN has adopted a comprehensive definition of the rule of law as: ―a principle of 
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including 
the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced 
and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles 
of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency‖ (UNSC, 
2004, para. 6). Pekka Hallberg, on the other hand, offers a more compact and clear 
definition. He argues that it is ―a house built on a solid ground‖, resting on four 
cornerstones: first, ―the principle of legality‖; second, ―the balanced separation of 
powers‖; third, ―the implementation of fundamental and human rights‖, and; fourth, ―the 
performance of the system‖ (Hallberg, 2005, p.5).  
A comparison between these four cornerstones and the five pillars of transitional justice 
shows that the two are in fact closely linked; both fundamentally aim at protecting the 
human rights of citizens, holding people accountable before the law as well as reforming 
institutions in a way as to ensure their adherence to the ―principle of supremacy of the 
law‖ and establish a clear separation of powers. In fact, in 2004 the UN, for the first 
time, made a clear link between the rule of law and transitional justice by stating that it 
30 
 
―reaffirms transitional justice as a crucial component of the UN‘s broader work on the 
rule of law‖ (ICTJ, 2011, para.2). 
One of the main elements of strengthening the rule of law in a post-conflict country is 
judicial reform (UNSC, 2004). As outlined above, the first pillar of transitional justice, 
criminal prosecutions, and the fourth pillar, institutional reform, help governments in 
strengthening their domestic courts through judicial reforms and training of the judges 
(ICTJ, 2013), which serve to strengthen three of the four cornerstones identified by 
Hallberg: the principle of legality, the balanced separation of powers, and the 
performance of the system. For example in Croatia, which went through a series of 
human rights violations during the breakdown of former Yugoslavia, transitional justice 
mechanisms were adopted and helped strengthen the rule of law. Some of the 
perpetrators of human right violations were tried under the ICTY while others were tried 
in domestic courts where special chambers were established to deal with war crimes. In 
terms of criminal justice and judicial reform, Croatia was able to reform ―its constitution 
to ensure the independence of prosecutors‖ and revise ―its system for the appointment of 
judges‖ (Reding & Mimica, 2013). Thus, on the first of July 2013, Croatia became the 
first country of the former Yugoslavia to join the European Union (EU) (Clingendael 
Netherland Institute of International Relations, 2013). 
Through this cooperation between international and domestic courts as well as 
implementing other mechanisms of transitional justice, Croatia also ―made significant 
progress in the field of the combat of corruption and organized crime and the reform of 
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the judiciary‖ (Clingendael Netherland Institute of International Relations, 2013, para.2) 
and was able to comply with the strict criteria for the rule of law needed for its accession 
to the EU. This is a prime example of how innovative transitional justice mechanisms 
that go beyond the traditional five pillars can also help strengthen the rule of law, 
primarily with regard to Hallberg‘s fourth cornerstone, the performance of the system.  
The remaining pillars of transitional justice also play a role in strengthening the rule of 
law. Truth-seeking not only provides the basis for a wider strategy to reach 
accountability in terms of the implementation of fundamental and human rights – the 
third cornerstone of rule of law as identified by Hallberg – inasmuch as it recognizes the 
violations of fundamental and human rights conducted during a conflict or by a previous 
oppressive regime, but the findings of such a process can also be used as a basis for the 
possible future prosecution of the violators (UNSC, 2004). As for reparations, be they 
symbolic or material, they are essential in acknowledging the harm caused by the regime 
and rebuilding the public trust in the state (UNSC, 2004). Vetting and dismissals are 
directly linked to the rule of law as civil servants who were affiliated with past abuses 
are held accountable and removed from their posts (Kritz, 1995). Both reparations and 
vetting and dismissals therefore strengthen two of Hallberg‘s four cornerstones of the 
rule of law: the principle of legality and the performance of the system.    
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2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has shown that transitional justice is an evolving field with mechanisms and 
processes that are still being developed and refined. The study therefore does not assume 
that the processes examined are comprehensive and exclusive, but rather that they 
represent the currently most broadly accepted and applied mechanisms for pursuing 
accountability and fighting impunity in a transitional context. 
On the basis of the examination presented above, it would seem that transitional justice 
mechanisms clearly have potential for dealing with the challenges facing any country in 
a post-conflict environment. It also seems clear that transitional justice mechanisms have 
proven to be an effective tool for strengthening the rule of law in countries experiencing 
transition or recovering from conflict.  
However, there are also several obstacles for implementing such mechanisms – given 
that transitional justice processes are most commonly pursued by the national 
government itself, one of the main obstacles is the national political environment and the 
extent to which there is political will for engaging in such processes. In the case of 
Lebanon for example, the former warlords are the politicians of today, which leads to 
complications when considering the viability of implementing a genuine process of 
transitional justice. Would politicians be ready to critically examine their own roles 
during the civil war? What are the carrots and the sticks that could be used in this case? 
What body would be able to implement any of the transitional justice mechanisms 
outlined above? What processes should form the starting point (truth-seeking, 
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reparations, criminal justice, institutional reform and vetting)? Where would the 
necessary financial resources be found? Are the Lebanese people ready for such 
processes?  
While it would seem reasonable to assume that transitional justice could also help 
restore accountability and the rule of law in Lebanon, to further assess the viability of 
this hypothesis and find possible answers to at least some of the questions outlined 
above, this study will need to examine the experiences of countries that have gone 
through various processes of transitional justice. For the purposes of this study, the case 
of one country in former Yugoslavia, Croatia, has been chosen as a case study for three 
main reasons: it can be considered to be a relevant comparison for Lebanon due to the 
nature of the identity-based conflict it went through in the 1990s, it implemented several 
transitional justice processes, including criminal justice mechanisms, and at least some 
of the countries that formerly constituted Yugoslavia, such as Croatia, have been 
successful in strengthening the rule of law to the extent that they are being considered as 
candidates for EU membership (or their membership has already been approved, as is 
the case for Croatia). By examining what mechanisms were employed in Croatia and the 
extent to which they played a role in strengthening the four cornerstones of the rule of 
law outlined above, this study will attempt to draw lessons learned for the possible 
mechanisms used as well as the ―carrots and sticks‖ used to implement them and 
consider whether similar mechanisms and incentives could be relevant also in the 
Lebanese context. 
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In so doing, the study will keep in mind that there is no ‗one size fits all‘ formula for 
implementing transitional justice and that each context has its own specificities and 
complexities, around which a transitional justice process needs to be tailored. 
Nevertheless, comparative experiences can serve as an inspiration for ways in which 
seemingly insurmountable challenges can be, and have been, tackled. 
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Chapter Three 
Transitional Justice in the Former-
Yugoslavia 
―We must know the truth; truth needs to be established and determined, truth 
needs to be faced, whatever it might be, and regardless of whether it will please all; 
there is only one truth‖ 
— Stjepan Mesić, President of Croatia (Subotić, 2009, p. 118) 
As much as truth is important in setting historical accounts straight and learning from 
the past in order to build a better future, dealing with a nation‘s past, especially one 
filled with atrocities, has never been an easy task to do. The ethnic conflict that the 
Former-Yugoslavia witnessed during the nineties has been compared to the Lebanese 
conflict. Given its identity based clashes, Makdisi, for example, described the Balkans as 
a ‗Lebanonized‖ conflict (Makdisi, 2008, p.21).  Unlike the case of Lebanon, where a 
general amnesty law was issued, countries in the Former-Yugoslavia have attempted to 
deal with their past and the perpetrators of the war by cooperating with the ICTY. This 
transitional justice initiative has helped countries like Croatia to establish democracy and 
the rule of law and even to become a member of the EU. The transitional justice 
processes in the Former-Yugoslavia have also shown the complexities involved in 
settling past accounts, in the form of having to find ways to deal with political spoilers 
from the past regime and the at times wavering domestic demand to look into the past.  
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Given the similarities between the contexts within which the conflicts in Lebanon and 
the Balkans took place, this part of the study will examine the transitional justice efforts 
that were undertaken in Croatia, how they affected democracy and the rule of law in the 
country, and to try to draw possible lessons that could provide examples for Lebanon in 
terms of how to implement transitional justice initiatives.  
Choosing the Former Yugoslavia in general and Croatia specifically as a case study is 
not the most common approach and perhaps deserves some further justification. In 
literature on post-conflict reconciliation, a comparison is more commonly made between 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon (see for example ―Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and 
Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon‖ by Michael Kerr). Indeed, if looking at 
the complexities involved in designing a power-sharing arrangement aimed at 
preventing the re-emergence of conflict, the case of Northern Ireland is perhaps more 
relevant to the Lebanese context. However, since the objective of this study is not to 
analyze the post-conflict settlement in terms of power-sharing or political structures, but 
rather to understand whether transitional justice mechanisms and processes could help to 
strengthen the rule of law, the experience of Northern Ireland is not particularly 
pertinent to my study.  
The Former Yugoslavia, on the other hand, gives a relevant example of a transitional 
justice process following an identity and community based conflict, where strengthening 
the rule of law was a specific objective. The comparative analysis provided in this 
chapter should therefore be understood in this context, with the limitations that come 
37 
 
with any comparative study between two different conflicts in two different countries, 
each with their political, historical and cultural specificities. 
The first section of this chapter will give a brief background of the conflict in order to 
illustrate the impact it had on the country and the consequent transitional justice process. 
The second section will focus on Croatia as a case study by looking at its relationship 
with the ICTY as well as the carrots and the sticks that led to Croatia‘s cooperation with 
the tribunal. It will then move on look at the effect of such an effort on the rule of law 
and accountability in the country.  
3.1.  Background of the Conflict  
Once a united federation composed of six republics, the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) started disintegrating largely as a consequence of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and its model of communism, which had played a key part in keeping the 
country unified, in the early 1990‘s. Prior to 1991, this federation was known as ―one of 
the largest, most developed and diverse countries in the Balkans‖ (ICTY, 2013, para.1) 
due to its mixture of ethnic groups and religions. The federation included the republics 
of Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro; 
with Kosovo and Vojvodina as two autonomous regions within Serbia. The main 
religions that dominated these republics were Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and 
Islam.  
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At a time when Eastern Europe was going through a period of heightened nationalism 
and the breakdown of communism, Yugoslavia, in its final years as a united federal 
nation, went through a rough period of economic and political crises. In this nationalistic 
atmosphere, the crisis in Yugoslavia began taking its toll as the federal government was 
getting weaker and nationalist groups were rapidly developing. On the political scene, 
the single party communist rule was being replaced by two emerging political parties 
with contradictory views: those who pushed for the independence of the republics on the 
one hand, and those who advocated for more control and authority of some republics 
within the Yugoslav federation on the other. The political leaders of the republics 
employed ―nationalist rhetoric‖ to fuel mistrust and capitalize on the growing fear 
among the various ethnic groups. In 1991, the collapse of the federation became more 
visible as Croatia and Slovenia blamed the Serbian authorities for controlling the 
federation‘s government and, in return, Serbia blamed these two republics for their 
separatist views (ICTY, 2013).  
Following the elections of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia elected non-communist 
governments who started pushing for more autonomy within the federation. Slovenia 
was the first republic to declare its independence on June 25, 1991, followed by Croatia 
who declared it later during the same day (ICTY, 2013).  As for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the results of the elections reflected the different constituencies in the 
country. Muslim Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs won seats in the parliaments, and as in the 
case of Macedonia, communists lost power. However, these two countries did not call 
for independence right away, as they were ready to stay in the Federation as long as they 
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enjoyed more autonomy (Center for European Studies [CES], 2004). Serbia and 
Montenegro, the remaining two republics, re-elected their communist governments. 
Slobodan Milošević, the president of Serbia, warned the voters of the social, economic 
and security drawbacks of an imminent change in the government. He was also able to 
influence the voters by using patriotic rhetoric, such as calling for a re-establishment of 
―Greater Serbia‖ which basically meant ―that Serbia was destined to increase in 
influence and territory in the region and reclaim ancient glories‖ (CES, 2004, p.6).  
Following Croatia and Slovenia‘s appeals for independence, the Yugoslav government 
was in a confusing position. The government was still in place and had bills to pay, 
services to provide for its citizens and an economy and an army to manage. What would 
become of the federal government if the republics called for independence?  
The federal government was not very pleased with these calls for independence and 
reacted strongly. In the case of Slovenia, the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav 
government ordered its invasion by the Yugoslav People‘s Army (YPA), which was 
mainly composed of Serbs. However, the attack on Slovenia was over relatively swiftly 
and smoothly, largely thanks to the Slovenian National Guard being very well trained; 
the conflict lasted for ten days and in the end Slovenia reaffirmed its control over its 
territories with minimal casualties sustained (CES, 2004) (ICTY, 2013).  
In Croatia, the case was different. Given its ethnic diversity, the minority of Croatian 
Serbs who wanted to remain in the federation rejected the Croatian State and rebelled. 
The rebellion, supported by Serbia and the YPA, seized one third of Croatian territory 
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and proclaimed it as ―an independent Serb State‖ (ICTY, 2013, para.3). In a Brutal 
campaign of ―ethnic cleansing‖, non-Serbs and Croats were forced to leave their homes. 
In 1992, a UN sponsored ceasefire was signed by the conflicting parties, and although it 
ended the conflict at that time, it was not the best recipe for peace as ―the Croatian Serbs 
had gained a large section of territory and agreeing to a cease-fire allowed them to keep 
it—thus, in many eyes legitimizing their attacks‖ (ICTY, 2013, para.3). The fighting 
broke out again in the summer of 1995, as the Croatians wanted to regain their territory 
from the Serbs. In the fall of 1995, the war finally ended as a result of two offensives 
strikes known as Operation Storm and Flash by Croatia, which was able to regain all of 
its territory (ICTY, 2013) (CES, 2004).  
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was also ethnically divided between three groups 
Muslims (44%), Serbs (32%) and Croats (17%) (Barber, 1992), shared the same fate as 
Croatia in 1992, as the results of a referendum, which was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs, 
showed that 60% of Muslim and Croatian Bosnians wanted their independence (ICTY, 
2013). In April 1992, war broke out as Bosnian Serbs, with the help of the YPA and 
Serbia, rebelled and declared the areas they controlled as part of the Serbian republic. In 
the aim of creating a ―Greater Serbia‖, Serbs initiated an ethnic cleansing campaign 
mainly against the Muslims and Croats, whereby they expelled them ―from their native 
areas in an effort to make the regions purely Serbian‖ (Barber, 1992, para.9). The 
Bosnian Croatians followed suit and declared their area as a republic supported by 
Croatia. This conflict was described as ―the deadliest of all in the disintegrating 
Yugoslav Federation‖ (ICTY, 2013, para.4) as it became three sided and very complex. 
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The conflict, which lasted from 1992 until 1995 ended through the Dayton Peace 
Agreement
4
, resulted in thousands of victims and massive human rights violations, 
specifically in the town of Srebrenica, a UN safe area that was invaded by the Serbs, 
resulting in the killing of 8000 citizens in a matter of days (ICTY,2013) (CES,2004).   
In 1998, conflict broke out in Kosovo as the ethnic Albanians wanted their independence 
from Serbia.  The rebellion was led by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was 
then crushed by the Serbian Police and Army. The conflict, which lasted for a year, 
ended after a 78 days airstrike campaign by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) against targets in Serbia and in Kosovo. Finally, Milošević accepted to 
withdraw the police and Serbian troops from Kosovo (ICTY, 2013) (CES, 2004).   Since 
1999, Kosovo has effectively had two parallel sets of state institutions: Serbia kept its 
pre-1999 administrative presence for the Serbian part of the population, while the 
Kosovo Albanians built their own institutions. EU-mediated talks between Serbia and 
Kosovo, related to the accession process of Serbia to the EU, have tried to solve the 
technical divisions between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, but have so far failed to find a 
sustainable solution to the political divisions in the country. As Seferi notes, ―Since EU 
accession won't happen soon with any country in the region, Serbia will not recognise 
Kosovo until then. But at some point, it will have to truly deal with Kosovo. Otherwise, 
it will go towards new blockades, tensions, hatred and the suffering of innocent people.‖ 
(Seferi, 2013, para 18).     
                                               
4 Sponsored by the United States, the Dayton Peace Agreement was reached on the 21st of November 1995 
between the heads of states of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia to end the conflict in Bosnia.  
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 In Macedonia, the separation went smoothly with the absence of armed clashes after it 
declared its independence in 1991 and the country was temporally known as the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ICTY, 2013).  
The conflict in the Balkans ended with the breakup of Former-Yugoslavia and some of 
the countries that were part of it gaining their independence. However, the war left 
behind it thousands of victims and resulted in massive crimes against humanity and 
human rights violations. In fact, this conflict and especially the Serbian attacks in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as well as Croatia ―were marked by brutality unseen in Europe since 
the World War II‖ (Suljagić, 2009, p.179). Thus, the newly independent countries were 
now burdened with a heavy and bloody past that needed to be dealt with.  
3.2.  The Case of Croatia  
The war in the Balkans was known for its brutality: thousands of civilians were 
massacred, displaced and tortured. This cruelty led the UN to send a ―Commission of 
Experts‖ in 1992 to verify the realities on the ground (ICTY, The Establishment, 2013). 
The report of this Commission concluded that violations of humanitarian law as well as 
breaches of the Geneva Convention were taking place. These findings resulted in the 
establishment of the international tribunal known as the ICTY through Security Council 
Resolution 827 in 1993. The aim of this first international tribunal established by the UN 
was to prosecute the perpetrators responsible for war crimes and ―stop the violence and 
safeguard international peace and security‖ (ICTY, The Establishment, 2013, para.5). 
Thus, according to the ICTY website, 1993 ―marked the beginning of the end of 
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impunity for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia‖ (ICTY, The Establishment, 2013, 
para.6). 
3.2.1. Croatia and the ICTY  
As an international ad hoc tribunal, the ICTY is very dependent on domestic cooperation 
because it lacks ―enforcement powers to compel state compliance with court orders‖ 
(Peskin & Boduszyński, 2003, p.1117). To be able to prosecute the perpetrators and 
fulfill its mandate, the ICTY, along with other international ad hoc tribunals, requires the 
state‘s assistance in handing them to The Hague. Thus the cooperation between the state 
and the tribunal is a prerequisite for the latter‘s success. In the case of Croatia, although 
it was one of the first countries in the Former-Yugoslavia to ask for a tribunal to 
prosecute war crimes that were committed during the Balkan war, its cooperation with 
The Hague has been described as ―selective, reluctant and insufficient‖ (Subotić, 2009, 
p.83).  
This behavior can be attributed to Croatia‘s position during the war and its change of 
government in 2000 from a more autocratic regime led by Tuđman to a more democratic 
one led by Mesić. Having had some of the conflict on its own territory, Croatia was seen 
―as both the victim and the perpetrator of mass atrocities‖ (Subotić, 2009, p. 85). In fact, 
during the war, the YPA, supported by Serbian rebels, imposed a brutal and violent siege 
on the Croatian city of Vukovar, and bombed the historic city of Dubrovnik which did 
not have any strategic value for the war ―other than demoralizing and humiliating 
Croatia‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.84). These assaults established Croatia as a victim of violent 
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attacks. However, Croatia also retaliated against Serbia and Serbian rebels operating 
within its territory in the form of two Operations, Flash and Storm, which helped it 
regain its territory from the Serbian rebels. These two operations were viewed by the 
Croatian population as liberation wars and were called ―homeland wars‖. However, in 
the eyes of the international community they were viewed as ―ethnic cleansing‖ 
operations involving the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Serbs and the killing of 
those who could not move (Subotić, 2009). Such violent acts made Croatia a perpetrator 
as well as a victim.  
After the ICTY‘s first indictment in 1995 of a Croatian general for atrocities committed 
during the Bosnian war in 1993, Croatia suspended its cooperation with the tribunal and 
chose to promote the indicted general instead (Peskin & Boduszyński, 2003). The 
regime of President Franjo Tuđman was known for being nationalist and autocratic, and 
the regime‘s move was not welcomed by the international community – the American 
ambassador to Croatia at that time stated that ―Tuđman‘s idea of cooperation with the 
tribunal was to kick his indicted officers upstairs‖ (Bass, 2000, p.244).  According to 
Peskin and Boduszyński, the government ―has pressured the court to prosecute Serbs for 
crimes against Croats, but has also lobbied for immunity when the tribunal has turned its 
attention to Croatian war crimes against Serbs‖ (Peskin & Boduszyński, 2003, p. 1119). 
Nevertheless, following pressure from the U.S., Tuđman succumbed and sent the general 
to The Hague. This reluctance to cooperate with the tribunal continued until Tuđman‘s 
death and the election of a pro-Western government in 2000.  
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With Stjepan Mesić as the new elected President and the formation of a new government 
headed by Ivica Račan, Croatia became more popular on the international front and its 
dealings with the ICTY were far smoother than during Tuđman‘s time. As a result, it 
was ―generously rewarded for its change of government and moves to correct its human 
rights reputation‖ by the international community (Subotić, 2009, p.87). The Račan 
government, which had the Europeanization of Croatia as its main aim was very open to 
dealing with the past. In fact, ―Račan presented the issue of justice for war crimes as a 
central part of establishing the rule of law and consolidating democracy in Croatia, 
necessary for Croatia‘s European pretensions‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.92). With the aim of 
differentiating itself from its predecessor, Croatia‘s government not only collaborated 
with the ICTY, it also made significant progress in terms of transitional justice. For 
instance, Mesić welcomed the return of Serbian refugees to the country and the 
government allocated $55 million to facilitate their return (Subotić, 2009). Although 
Croatia was faced with former regime spoilers and domestic pressure to avoid its 
collaboration with the ICTY, its government managed to fully collaborate with the 
international tribunal by sending its final indicted to The Hague in 2005, thus fulfilling 
its international obligations (Subotić, 2009).  As part of its obligations to the tribunal, 
Croatia also managed to create its own ―domestic war-crimes trials‖ within the country, 
which also tried some of the perpetrators of the war in Croatia, instead of sending them 
to The Hague (Subotić, 2009).     
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3.2.2. Carrots and Sticks  
Croatia‘s cooperation with the ad hoc tribunal was not solely based on its desire to make 
amends for the past and prosecute perpetrators for war crimes. Its commitment to such 
efforts was also based on the desire to secure the support of the international community, 
mainly the U.S., and to facilitate its accession to the EU. The pressure from the 
international community on Croatia to collaborate with international justice was very 
high, but it was matched with equally high rewards when collaboration was 
forthcoming.  
Following Tuđman‘s refusal to send the first Croatian general to The Hague, the U.S. 
threatened to put an end to the military and financial aid it was giving to Croatia. This 
pressure led Tuđman to change his policy and cooperate with The Hague. To the 
Croatian nationalists who resented this move, Tuđman claimed that the general in 
question volunteered to present himself to the Court (Subotić, 2009). Moreover, the 
newly elected government was also rewarded with Croatia‘s admission to the NATO 
Partnership for Peace as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO). It also received 
financial aid from the U.S. amounting to $30 million (Subotić, 2009, p.89). 
The EU also used future membership of Croatia in the Union as both a carrot and a stick 
to encourage Croatia‘s compliance with the ICTY. Just like the U.S. poured financial aid 
into Croatia after the election of the new government in 2000, the EU also gave the 
country $23 million in aid. Furthermore, Croatia received indications regarding its 
accession to the EU. In fact, in October 2001, Croatia signed the Stabilisation and 
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Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, which according to Subotić, meant that 
―Croatia was clearly on the fast track back to Europe‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.87). In cases 
where the government faced objections from the nationalists against sending indicted 
generals to The Hague, Račan used the EU stick to justify the collaboration, arguing that 
―Croatia had a legal obligation to cooperate with the tribunal and that the country‘s 
application to the EU would be sidelined if the Croatia refused to cooperate with the 
Hague‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.95). As much as the nationalists were unwilling to cooperate 
with the tribunal, using the EU stick would always work as both the government and the 
opposition shared the aim of the Europeanization of their country. In fact, in 2001, two 
generals were indicted by the ICTY for crimes and forced deportation against Croatian 
Serbs during Operation Storm in 1995. This indictment caused a political and a domestic 
stir as Operation Storm was viewed by the nationalists and the public as a defensive war 
and not and offensive one. Nationalists, who refused this indictment, went on to accuse 
that the cooperation of the government with the tribunal was against national values and 
that it ―bargained and betrayed all values achieved in the homeland war‖ (Peskin, & 
Boduszyński, 2003, p.1141). Mesić, a savvy politician, was able to resolve this issue and 
send the two generals to The Hague by arguing that the individualization of war crimes 
would enhance Croatia‘s values and not the other way around. He stated that ―the 
Croatian nation should not and will not be hostage to those who bloodied their hands, 
bringing shame upon Croatia‘s name – no matter what credits they might have 
otherwise‖ (Gall & Simons, 2001, para.8). As a carrot for its collaboration, the EU‘s 
commissioner for external relations, Chris Patten, praised this step and stated ―I applaud 
the decision of the Croatian Government to comply with their international obligations 
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in respect of indictments by the ICTY. I urge the people of Croatia to support that 
decision, difficult though that may be for many of them to do: it is the only course of 
action open to their government if it is serious about Croatia's European future and 
international commitments‖ (EU Press Release, 2001, para.5).  
To sum up, transitional justice in Croatia, especially cooperation with the ICTY, was 
seen as the country‘s ticket to become a member of the EU. Following the death of 
Tuđman, Croatia‘s newly elected president and prime minister used this issue to enhance 
Croatia‘s position in the international system as well as to achieve their goal of 
Europeanizing their country. Due to international pressure and the EU card, Croatia 
managed to collaborate with the international tribunal and fulfill its international 
obligations. As a believer in international justice, Račan was able to accomplish his 
strategy and convince nationalists of the need to cooperate with the tribunal. Before his 
speech seeking a vote of confidence in 2001, he addressed the parliament by saying ―It 
is hard for one nation to face dark pages of his history – even harder for a small nation. 
But we have to give a chance to the world to respect us, while fighting for our truth‖ 
(Subotić, 2009, p.96). Thus, in the words of Subotić, ―transitional justice was once again 
placed in the service of the Croatian state and its European strategy‖ (Subotić, 2009, 
p.96).   
It is important to stress that the implementation of transitional justice initiatives in 
Croatia was successful due the combination of international pressure and a strong 
leadership interested in reckoning with the past and implementing transitional 
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justice – not only on the international level such as the ICTY, but also at home where it 
introduced several judicial reforms that helped enhance its rule of law. In comparison, 
this was not the case in Serbia, for example, where the leadership eventually 
collaborated with the ICTY due to considerable international pressure, but refused to 
make changes at home. According to Subotić, ―the Serbian government made no effort 
to reform its judiciary or police to the degree that any domestic investigations and 
prosecutions for war crimes could take place‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.51).    
3.3. Rule of Law in Croatia  
As demonstrated above, the process of transitional justice, especially criminal justice in 
Croatia, was not particularly easy or smooth to achieve. This process was continuously 
hindered by nationalists who had their own narrative of the war and did not want to 
deliver perpetrators to The Hague because they saw them as war heroes (Subotić, 2009). 
With a government keen on Europeanizing the country, pressure to achieve international 
justice was seen as a means to an end, which led Croatia to finalize its full cooperation 
with the ICTY in 2005. In the process of collaborating with the ICTY as well as its 
accession to the EU, the rule of law in Croatia witnessed major enhancements, most 
notably in terms of judiciary reform and the reduction of corruption.  
Although it is difficult to quantify changes in the rule of law, the level of corruption is a 
relevant proxy to measuring overall respect for the rule of law. Improvements in tackling 
corruption in Croatia throughout the years of its cooperation with the ICTY can be 
observed through examining the country‘s ranking in the Corruption Perception Index 
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(CPI) produced by Transparency International (TI). In 1999, out of 99 countries 
examined, Croatia ranked 74
th
, right after India (Transparency International [TI], 1999). 
Following its change of government, its corruption levels reduced in 2002, as it ranked 
51
st
 out of 102 countries (TI, 2002). Croatia‘s fight against corruption continued and in 
2007, it ranked 64
th
 out of 179 countries (TI, 2007). Again, in 2011, it ranked 66
th
 out of 
182 countries (TI, 2011). This progress in the field of anti-corruption can be used as a 
meaningful proxy for measuring the overall development of respect for the rule of law in 
Croatia because, according to Thomas Carothers, the latter cannot strive in a corrupt 
society or system (Carothers, 1998, p. 96).    
Croatia also made significant progress in terms of judiciary reforms, which allowed it to 
enhance its rule of law. The most notable developments were ―the creation of 
specialized chambers to handle war crimes cases‖ (Cruvellier&Valinas, 2006, p.14) 
which tried war criminals in domestic courts instead of sending them all to The Hague. 
These developments required training of local judges and international expertise, which 
helped in terms of strengthening the judiciary. In terms of dealing with war crimes, its 
legislation was once again strengthened in 2004 as amendments to the country‘s 
criminal code were incorporated to include ―the doctrine of command responsibility as a 
basis for liability‖ (Cruvellier&Valinas, 2006, p. 2). Although human rights activists 
viewed these reforms in the Croatian judicial system as incomplete, Croatia was able to 
significantly differentiate itself when it comes to ―the quality of its domestic transitional 
justice‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.108) from its close Bosnian and Serbian neighbors. Subotić 
argues that the reasons behind these changes go back to Croatia‘s elite wanting their 
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country to be integrated with the EU. She states that this desire for integration was 
mutually shared by a vast majority of the political actors, and ―that the government 
moved aggressively to change and improve its justice institutions and reshape them to 
make them more internationally acceptable‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.108).    
3.3.1. Cornerstones of the Rule of Law 
As mentioned in the second chapter, Pekka Hallberg bases the rule of law on four 
cornerstones. These cornerstones interact with each other to strengthen the rule of law 
and are comprised of ―the balanced separation of powers‖, ―implementation of 
fundamental and human rights‖, ―performance of the system‖ and ―the principle of 
legality‖ (Hallberg, 2005, p.5).  Croatia, with its ambitions to accede to the EU, has been 
working during the past ten years to strengthen its rule of law and democracy.  
As a democratic country, Croatia‘s government is based on the principle of separation of 
powers between its three branches: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. This 
principle ―includes levels of mutual co-operation and reciprocal control of the holder of 
power prescribed by the Constitution and law‖ (Republic of Croatia, 2013, para.2). 
Unlike Lebanon, where the executive branch through the Ministry of Justice is 
responsible for the appointment and promotion of judges, ―which brings the 
independence of the judiciary as a separate branch of government into question‖ (Saliba, 
2010, para.8). In the case if Croatia, the constitution states that the State Judiciary 
Council appoints and relieves judges from their duties (Republic of Croatia, 2013). 
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Regarding the ―implementation of fundamental and human rights‖, it is argued that 
Croatia has been working on enhancing the respect of human rights through transitional 
justice more than its neighboring countries (Subotić, 2009). In fact, its full collaboration 
with the ICTY and its accession to the EU in 2013 shows that Croatia ―has continued to 
take various measures to raise public awareness and improve protection of human 
rights‖ (European Commission, 2011, para.6). Respect for human rights, especially 
dealing with past human rights violations, was able to strive in Croatia due to ―the 
presence of a heterogeneous group of true believers in the ideas of institutions of 
transitional justice‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.116), comprising its political elites, especially 
President Mesić, as well as a broad section of civil society.  
―The performance of the system‖ rests on how citizens perceive their system and 
whether or not they trust it. The Croats place high value on their state and consider it to 
be ―intact, untouchable and unquestionable‖ (Subotić, 2009, p.109). With such trust in 
their state, a political analyst from the Serbian Democratic Forum went on to state that 
―Croats don‘t believe in Jesus Christ, but they believe in the Croatian state‖ (Subotić, 
2009, p.109). 
In terms of ―the principle of legality‖, the anti-corruption efforts taken in Croatia, which 
are evident from its progress on the Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index, seem to demonstrate that Croatia is on the right path. In January 2013, Croatia 
established a commission mandated to fight conflicts of interest in the public 
administration. Only two months after its establishment, this commission had raised 
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cases against 26 officials who were accused of having been involved in decisions that 
constituted a conflict of interests (European Commission, 2013). 
3.4.  Conclusion 
Dealing with the past is not the easiest path to embark on, especially in a situation where 
a country has been through a bloody conflict riddled with human rights abuses. In the 
same way as Lebanon, the Balkan conflict was largely an identity-based conflict. The 
path of the different states seeking independence from the Yugoslav Federation was 
rough and filled with human rights abuses. Although Yugoslavia represents a situation 
of a country disintegrating into several smaller states, whereas Lebanon does not, the 
community-based nature of conflict in Lebanon and the Former-Yugoslav countries 
share several common elements: most importantly, each of the warring communities 
viewed its war criminals as war heroes who were engaged in an existential conflict. It is 
this romanticized vision of the war in particular that makes it very hard to deal with the 
crimes committed and the war criminals who committed them, let alone engaging in 
public trials. It takes strong political will to achieve justice in such circumstances, as the 
example of Croatia demonstrates. With a leadership keen to come to terms with the 
country‘s past atrocities, combined with strong international support and pressure, 
Croatia was able to fully collaborate with the requirements of the international tribunal. 
This paper does not claim that Croatia‘s rule of law and democracy have been enhanced 
solely through its cooperation with the ICTY, on the contrary, Croatia‘s successive 
governments used the EU carrot to enact reforms that would ensure the country complies 
with international best practices and enhance its democracy and rule of law.  
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Knowing that the process of dealing with the past in Croatia has not been easy and that 
the country still faces major challenges at the level of its national narrative about the 
conflict, it is important to highlight that the country had the will to at least try to look in 
its own backyard and admit the mistakes that were done during the war, and to try to 
take measures to fix them. Although Croatia is not a perfect example of a full and 
complete transitional justice process, it offers good insights for other countries seeking 
to come to terms with a complex and violent past, such as Lebanon, on how to deal with 
war amnesia for the sake of a better future. The most important lesson learned from 
Croatia is that strong political will and leadership backed by strong international 
pressure is central for the success of transitional justice initiatives. Breaking from the 
past and healing the wounds of victims is not an easy quest, it is a long process that is 
both financially and morally costly, but ultimately fruitful and well worth the cost, if 
done correctly. 
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Chapter Four 
The Case of Lebanon 
―I think the end of the 1975 civil war could, theoretically, be a point of beginning 
for a new history in which we will not be destined to engage in civil wars; yet it depends 
on many factors which, unfortunately, are not taking place‖  
—Elias Khoury (Beirut Review, 2009, para.4) 
From 1975 until 1990, Lebanon witnessed a devastating and controversial ―civil‖ war 
that was characterized by sectarianism and fueled by external influence. After 15 years 
of warfare, Lebanon was left with approximately 144,000 people killed, 197,000 injured, 
17,000 disappeared, some 750,000 displaced and one third of the population emigrated. 
On top of that, the country suffered the destruction of its infrastructure, estimated at a 
cost of $25 billion USD, as well as the breakdown of state institutions (Leenders, 2012) 
(Barak, 2007). As a result of the war and the displacement, one third of the population is 
considered to be currently living under the poverty line (Khalaf, 2012).   
This chapter seeks to uncover the post war settlements that took place after the conflict 
ended and their consequences on the current political situation in Lebanon, with the aim 
of assessing how they affected the rule of law. This chapter will be divided into two 
sections: the first part will give a brief background of the war and the post-war 
settlements that followed; the second part will examine developments in Lebanon that 
took place in parallel with, but separate from, official post-war settlements.  
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4.1. The War and Its Consequences 
According to Khalaf, the war was ―wasteful, futile and unfinished‖ (Khalaf, 2012, p. 77) 
as it ―did not resolve the issues which had sparked the initial hostilities‖ (Khalaf, 2012, 
p.85). Indeed, this violent war did not amend the ―internal imbalances‖ nor did it lead 
the country to a more peaceful and civil form of diversity or ―coexistence‖ (Khalaf, 
2012). Instead, for 15 years, Lebanon was caught in different forms of atrocities, 
committed by parties ranging from the national armed forces to private militias, that left 
thousands of victims and caused a lot of suffering to the country as a whole. Khalaf 
explains that as the conflict dragged on, ―the hostility degenerated into communal and 
in-group turf wars, combatants were killing not those they wanted to kill but those they 
could kill‖ (Khalaf, 2012, p.13).  Knudsen and Yassin stress that the Lebanese war ―was 
fought by militias that were commanded by warlords. Indeed, the Lebanese civil war has 
been portrayed as the quintessential twentieth-century example of warlords and 
warlordism in the Middle East‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.119).  
Given that this conflict did not only include Lebanese parties, it resulted in the forging 
and breaking down of alliances both between the different Lebanese militias, as well as 
between them and the Palestinians, Israelis and Syrians.  According to Corm, the aim of 
militia wars is to destroy the foundations of society, and so was the case of Lebanon 
(Corm, 2003). The militia fighters ―took control of the streets and neighborhoods, the 
government collapsed, the army disintegrated along confessional lines and Beirut was 
cantonized into a Christian East and a Muslim West‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.119). 
Another manifestation of such fragmentation described by Corm, was the forced 
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displacements which could also be considered as a sort of collective violence. According 
to Aida Kanafi-Zahar, throughout the war, the number of displacements varied between 
600,000 and 800,000. The forced displacements were most acute during the ―Two Years 
War‖, during which the Lebanese were assassinated based on their religious identity. 
Another episode of displacements was during the Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982. 
―The War of the Mountains‖ between Druze and Christian militias ended up with the 
expulsion of around 160,000 Christians from their towns in the Chouf area (Kanafi-
Zahar, 2011).   
Other sorts of violence that ravaged the Lebanese people during the war were the 
massacres committed and the forced disappearances. From 1975 until 1982, in terms of 
massacres, Labaki and Abou Rjeily identify at least five, which do not include the ones 
that happened during ―The War of the Mountains‖ and ―Black Saturday‖ (which took 
place in the beginning of the war and was launched by Christians against Muslims and 
Palestinians) (ICTJ, 2013, Lebanon‘s Legacy of Political Violence). Three of the five 
massacres took place in 1976: the Karantina massacre launched by Christians against 
Palestinians, followed by the Damour massacre which was launched by the Palestinians 
against the Christians, and finally the siege of Tell Za‘tar by Christian militias (ICTJ, 
2013). Another two massacres, known as the Sabra and Chatila massacres, took place in 
1982 and were carried out by Christian militias with the help of the Israeli army against 
Palestinians (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p.29). According to Labaki and Abou Rjeily, as a 
result of the massacres from 1978 until 1986, the death toll reached around 4261 
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individuals. During ―The War of the Mountains‖ alone, around 1,155 bodies were found 
lying dead in the villages and on the streets (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p.28).   
In terms of disappearances, there is no specific number due to the lack of official 
surveys. However, renowned civil society organizations such as Amnesty International 
(AI) adopted 17,000 as the number of disappeared during the war. This estimation 
includes individuals disappeared on Lebanese soil by Lebanese militias as well as 
individuals imprisoned in Syrian and Israeli prisons (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011). 
These massacres and disappearances were accompanied by the massive destruction of 
the country‘s infrastructure as well as homes and places of worship. In the Chouf area 
alone, more than 4,900 homes were destroyed and around 14,000 were damaged 
(Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p.31). The war also became infamous for the assassinations that 
ended up killing political figures on both sides, including Kamal Jumblat in 1977, the 
President elect Bashir Gemayel in 1982, Prime Minister Rashid Karami in 1987 as well 
as other prominent political and religious figures. Car bombs killed not only targeted 
leaders but thousands of civilians as well – according to Knudsen & Yassin, the war 
witnessed around 3,600 car bombs, which left approximately 4,600 people dead 
(Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.119).   
After almost two decades of warfare, the Lebanese war ended and with it came the ―loss 
of state authority‖, a devastated economy and a country penetrated by external actors. 
Tom Najem explains that the state lost its authority in the first phases of the war when 
the Lebanese army collapsed. He states that ―even when the military was reconstituted to 
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some extent during several subsequent phases, the state institutions never really regained 
the dominance of the system that they had enjoyed from 1943 to 1975‖ (Najem, 2012, p. 
44). As for the economy, the war left the country with a ravaged physical infrastructure. 
The country witnessed large numbers of displacements and devastated property as well 
as mass emigration of the middle class, thus depriving the country of their capital and 
skills. Lebanon fell into massive debt and its economy collapsed, resulting in Lebanon 
losing ―its traditional role as the regional center for international trade and finance‖ 
(Najem, 2012, p.47). According to AI, the result of the war that ravaged the country is 
that ―state institutions, including the army, collapsed and with them the rule of law‖ (AI, 
1997, p. 1).  Another effect of the war was the penetration of external actors into the 
country. Prior to the war, the Lebanese state, through the use of a moderate rhetoric and 
international backing, managed to ―stave off major instances of external interference in 
Lebanese Affairs‖ (Najem, 2012, p.45). The first party to penetrate Lebanon was the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was able to alter Lebanon‘s foreign 
policy and include it in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria penetrated Lebanon during the 
war and managed to dominate the country until 2005, as will be explained later. Israel 
also played a role in destabilizing the country as it took over the Southern area and has 
been involved in conflicts in Lebanese territory even after the 1990‘s. Iran as well as 
other Islamic movements managed to penetrate the country via Hezbollah, which 
weakened the image of Lebanon, which is now considered by the West to be ―a major 
breeding ground for international terrorism‖ (Najem, 2012, p. 46).    
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4.2. Unsuccessful Reconciliation Attempts 
After fifteen years of warfare, the government thought of putting together reconciliation 
efforts to end the bloodshed and the sectarian divides posed by the war. The first 
―reconciliation‖ effort that ended the war was the Taif Agreement followed by a general 
Amnesty law. The long-term effect of these two efforts lasted for less than twenty years 
as in 2008 violence reoccurred again in Beirut between Lebanese factions and another 
sedative agreement, the Doha Agreement, was brokered. The following part will look 
into these three initiatives in order to examine their effect on the Lebanese society.   
4.2.1. Taif Accord 
In September 1989, under the patronage of the League of Arab States Tripartite 
Committee, 62 members of the Lebanese Parliament, elected in 1972, gathered in Taif, a 
resort city in Saudi Arabia, where they negotiated the Taif Accord officially known as 
the ―Document of National Understanding‖ that was ratified by the Lebanese parliament 
on November 5, 1989 (Norton, 1991). This Accord, supported by the U.S, the Arab 
Higher Tripartite Committee and directly supervised by Syria, formally marked the end 
of the15 year conflict in Lebanon. 
The Accord has two main elements. The first focuses on internal and institutional 
reforms such as identity, power sharing, sovereignty, socio-economic reform, internal 
security, participation and political reform, including the progressive abolition of the 
confessional system. The second focuses on external relations, such as the Lebanese-
Syrian relations as well as the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Karam Karam, the 
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thinking behind this Accord reflects a dual ambition for society as a whole on the one 
hand and the state on the other. Karam states that ―On the one hand it symbolizes 
reconciliation objectives, responding to the needs of a society that had been searching 
for effective tools to end the war and to reinforce national cohesion, supported by a 
desire to ‗live together‘. On the other hand it introduces reforms to support the 
consolidation of the Lebanese state and national institutions.‖ (Karam, 2012, p.36) 
One of the repercussions of the Taif Accord is that it legitimized the Syrian patronage 
over Lebanon that was later institutionalized through the ―Treaty of Brotherhood and 
Cooperation‖. This ―Brotherly‖ agreement asserted political and economical hegemony 
of Syria over Lebanon (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.120) and ―gave Syria a technically 
legal and very effective means to exercise decisive influence over all policy decisions‖ 
(Najem, 2012, p.53). According to Knudsen and Yassin, Taif ―was brokered by Saudi 
Arabia on Syria‘s terms at the expense of Lebanon‘s sovereignty‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 
2012, p.120). This Syrian tutelage weakened the already flaccid Lebanese state, as its 
authority over its people and its control over its territory were decisions that were 
primarily taken in Syria. For instance, and as Tom Najem puts it: ―in a  strikingly open 
display of contempt for the formal procedures, the new Prime Minister, Omar Karami, 
was actually announced as Hoss‘s successor in the Syrian press two days prior to his 
nomination in the Lebanese parliament‖ (Najem, 2012, p. 52). The Syrian tutelage over 
Lebanon not only affected the country‘s foreign policy, but also played a negative role in 
terms of accountability. Allies of the Syrian regime were given privileges and impunity, 
whereas its opponents were prosecuted and activists ―were arrested and subjected to 
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physical torture‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.122). Newspapers, television and radio 
stations that were affiliated with political opponents of the Syrian regime were 
suspended and in 1994, ―public demonstrations were banned‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, 
p.122).  
In terms of disarmament, the Accord states that the disarmament of all the Lebanese 
militias should take place within 6 months after the official approval of this Agreement; 
unfortunately, this provision was only applied on some militias and excluded others. In 
Southern Lebanon, armed groups in the Palestinian camps that were backed by Syria as 
well as pro-Iranian armed militias like Hezbollah were able to keep their weapons and 
Hezbollah was even portrayed in the government as the Lebanese resistance political 
party that stands against the Israeli occupation (El Khazen, 2001). According to Zahar, 
―Hezbollah was granted an exception [to disarm] by the government of the day because, 
it was argued, its weapons were intended to fight Israeli occupation of Lebanon‖ (Zahar, 
2013, p.68). This unequal disarmament contributed to sectarian tensions in the country 
as the Christians such as the LF were forced to abandon their weapons whereas 
Muslims, such as Hezbollah and the Palestinians were not touched by this decision. On 
the other hand, it also meant that the State did not have full control over its territory as it 
has other armed groups that could threaten its security and might not abide by its laws. 
Moubarak argues that the selective implementation of the disarmament clause in the Taif 
Accord, which targets all Lebanese militias except the ones resisting Israel, such as 
Hezbollah, is due to the Syrian interests in managing the domestic and international 
affairs of Lebanon. He states that ―Syria looks at Hizbollah as a Syrian and regional 
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necessity, and overlooks the fact that Hizbollah‘s armed presence especially in areas 
outside the south is a violation of the Taif Accord, a fact that could only disrupt inter-
communal relations and exacerbate fears‖ (Moubarak, 2003, p.21). 
What is interesting about this Accord, given that it was set up to put an end to the bloody 
conflict, is that it fails to make any significant reference to the war in any of its clauses. 
The victims of this conflict and the human rights abuses that they suffered were not even 
acknowledged. Other than mentioning the issue of the displaced, the word ―victim‖ does 
not appear in any parts of the Accord. On top of that, it lacks policies or mechanisms 
that help dealing with the past abuses in terms of justice for the victims and perpetrators 
or non-repetition of human rights violations (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p. 35). The absence of 
such measures reinforces the culture of impunity and lack of accountability in Lebanon.  
It could be argued that the flaws in this agreement threaten today‘s peace, by ―leaving 
Lebanese political life stuck in a stalemate that has lasted longer than the war itself‖ 
(Picard& Ramsbotham, 2012, p.7). According to Picard, the ―confessional political 
structures decided at Taif have facilitated the extension, elaboration and entrenchment of 
civil war sectarian animosities‖ (Picard & Ramsbotham, 2012, p.7). Picard adds that as 
Taif was ―agreed by elites (pre-war and wartime), the revised ‗national deal‘ to share 
power amongst a conservative oligarchy has done little to extend political inclusion or 
representation, but rather has enabled leaders to tighten their grip‖ (Picard& 
Ramsbotham, 2012, p.7). 
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Not all Lebanese were equally appreciative of the Taif, with especially the Christian 
community broadly critical of the agreement, which weakened their position and 
contributed to their feeling of frustration (Haugbolle, 2010, p. 68). Leaders such as 
Michel Aoun, the Maronite Prime Minister at the time, categorically rejected this 
Agreement. He considered it illegal since he had dissolved the Parliament at the time of 
its ratification. Aoun criticized Taif by saying, ―It did not call, even in principle, for a 
Syrian Withdrawal from all of Lebanese territory, but only a redeployment of Syrian 
forces to the Bekaa Valley two years after the ratification of the Accord‖ (Norton, 1991, 
p.466). Patriarch Sfeir stated that although Taif may be a solution to the current crisis, it 
might nevertheless lead to death and division between the Lebanese (Sinno, 2008). As 
for Raymond Edde, he considered that Taif made Lebanon a ―Syrian Colony‖ (Sinno, 
2008). Moreover, according to Gebran Tueni, 95.5 % of the Lebanese were against the 
Deputies that convened in Taif. He further accused these delegates of treason and selling 
their country (Sinno, 2008). Messara on his part, criticized the text by questioning the 
sovereignty of the Lebanese State as mentioned in the Accord. He highlighted the fact 
that a state cannot be sovereign if its decisions and lands are shared by another country, 
which is the authority Syria was given by the Taif (Messarra, 2006).  
It is important to note that even today, only some of the clauses of the Taif have been 
implemented, with many important clauses – especially the ones targeting internal 
political reforms crucial to state-building, such as reforming the electoral law, engaging 
in abolishing confessionalism, and decentralization – among those which have not.  
Furthermore, the reforms that have been implemented were selective and done under the 
65 
 
Syrian tutelage, following Syrian interests; as Zahar notes, ―they transformed the 
implementation of the agreement into a menu for choice, selecting those items that 
suited their strategic objectives and discarding items for which they had little use‖ 
(Zahar, 2013, p.70). The implemented reforms included the amendments defining 
Lebanon‘s relations with Syria, as well as the redistribution of power between the Troika 
(President, Prime Minister and the Speaker) whereby the president‘s executive and 
constitutional authorities were reduced in favor of the Council of Ministers, and a new 
power sharing formula was introduced with regards to the numbers of seats in 
parliament and appointments to public offices to achieve equality between the Christians 
and the Muslims. Also, more than 30 amendments were introduced into the constitution, 
such as the ―general principles‖ part of the Taif, which now constitutes the preamble of 
the constitution. Also, the Constitutional Council was established, but remains with no 
real powers (Karam, 2012, p.38).  
One can conclude that this partial and selective implementation of the Accord has 
heightened sectarian tensions among the population and further damaged already fragile 
state institutions. According to Karam Karam, ―the selective implementation of the Taif 
Agreement has belied the essence of its stated objectives. Arbitrary and partial 
application of reforms that have been initiated by Lebanese ruling elites under Syrian 
tutelage have in fact exacerbated confessional tension and competition, and have 
generated new imbalances in the post-war political system‖ (Karam, 2012, p.37). He 
further adds that ―these developments have undermined the operation of Lebanon‘s 
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consociational political system and of its institutions, which could be described as quasi-
dysfunctional‖ (Karam, 2012, p.37).  
4.2.2. The Amnesty Law 
As discussed above, by not mentioning the war, its victims and its perpetrators, and by 
instituting Syrian tutelage, the Taif Accord already granted a kind of impunity to 
Lebanese and non Lebanese actors that played a role in the conflict, but this was further 
reinforced by the Amnesty Law of 1991.  
The 1991 General Amnesty Law No. 84/91 was introduced on 26 August 1991, only two 
years after Taif and exonerated the atrocities that took place during the war, including 
crimes against humanity and war crimes that were committed against Lebanese civilians 
before March 28, 1991. Marking a difference between the treatment of crimes against 
internationals and crimes considered ‗local‘, human rights violations/offenses committed 
against state security or political and religious leaders or Arab and foreign diplomats 
were not covered by the amnesty (AI, 1997). The pro amnesty group argued that ―it 
provided a sense of stability as it was giving everybody a second chance, and since there 
are no clear winners, putting a large number of people on trial would have brought the 
country to a stand-still as there were not enough resources to carry out such 
prosecutions‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.390). This law, which ―aimed at turning a new 
page in the political history of Lebanon‖ (AI, 1997, p.7), legitimatized the difference 
between the ordinary citizens and the religious and political figures and is described by 
Nizar Saghieh as an ―inacceptable distinction‖. Saghieh further states that by 
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―introducing this distinction, the legislator is granting a higher value for the leader. We 
forgot about collective massacres, crimes against humanity and ordinary victims, only 
the death of a leader is to be punished‖ (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p.38). On the other hand, 
―instead of reconciling the citizens with the principle of justice and the rule of law, 
Lebanon‘s authorities were always in favor of political leaders consolidating their 
positions as superior to the rest of the population‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.390).   
This ―sweeping amnesty‖ was seen as a consolidation of impunity and an impediment to 
democracy. The UN Human Rights Committee was among those who criticized the law 
and stated that ―such a sweeping amnesty may prevent the appropriate investigation and 
punishment of the perpetrators of past human rights violations, undermine efforts to 
establish respect for human rights, and constitute an impediment to efforts undertaken to 
consolidate democracy‖ (AI, 1997, p. 8). AI, who adopted a similar reaction as the UN 
Human Right committee, added that ―a new future of true and lasting peace and human 
rights protection in Lebanon is only possible if the country comes to terms with its past 
through a process aimed at investigating and establishing the truth of the war period and 
its related abuses‖ (AI, 1997, p.8).  
This law coupled with the Taif agreement affected not only the post war political 
structure of Lebanon, but society as well. In terms of politics, it allowed the militia 
leaders and warlords to ―assume ministerial posts and for their militias to be turned into 
parties‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.120) and thus granted them impunity for their 
bloody actions. Notorious leaders such as Elie Hobeiqa who was known to be 
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responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacres as well as Nabih Berri, head of Amal, a 
Shiite militia and Walid Jumblat, the Druze leader, represent some of the ―bloodstained‖ 
figures that secured posts in the post Taif regime. According to Haugbolle, ―those 
responsible for massacres, theft, war crimes and displacement of civilians committed by 
militias under their command became responsible for rebuilding the country. Naturally, 
these people had no great desire to shed further light on the past‖ (Haugbolle, 2010, 
p.69). On the societal level, it led to a ―state-sponsored amnesia‖ or ―collective amnesia‖ 
which according to Haugbolle, ―has been fostered by political elites who played a role in 
the civil war and have refused to foster public debates that could implicate them‖ 
(Haubgolle, 2012, p.15). This lack of encouragement of a public debate about the past 
has led to the ―social practices of sectarian affiliation‖ to structure ―interpretations of the 
war and to reproduce simplified antagonistic discourse of the ‗other‘‖ (Haugbolle, 2010, 
p.69). In other words, although the leaders talked about national reconciliation, they had 
no real intent of institutionalizing it or debating it. This left a divided nation with 
unresolved grievances, where each sectarian group had its own narrative of the war and 
where each was ―quietly apprehensive of the ‗others‘‖ (Haugbolle, 2010, p.69).  
4.2.3. The Doha Agreement  
The distorted image of the ―other‖ amongst the Lebanese continued throughout the post 
war period as no true government led reconciliation effort was successful. Following the 
Hariri assassination in 2004, the Lebanese political scene was divided into two main 
blocs, March 14 which was an anti-Syrian bloc comprised mainly of the Future 
movement and Christians and March 8 which was pro-Syrian mainly composed of 
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Hezbollah and Amal and some Christian parties. After several months of ―political 
paralyses‖ and due to internal political rivalries and tensions between these two camps, 
on May 7, 2008, Beirut witnessed another round of internal violence. These clashes were 
attributed two government decisions, the first one stipulated firing the head of the airport 
security, Wafiq Shuqeir, a close ally of Hezbollah; and the second one was related to 
taking apart the secure telecommunication network of Hezbollah (Mousavi, 2008). 
However, the root causes of these clashes extend beyond these two governmental 
decisions. One of the causes is related to the growing role of Hezbollah in the Lebanese 
political arena. Backed by Iran and Syria, Hezbollah is officially the only Lebanese 
militia that has been allowed to keep its arms as a deterrent force to Israel and has been 
portrayed as the national resistance party. Following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and 
the July War in 2006, the polarization between March 14 and March 8 heightened as 
each group perceived the other as an opponent, and as a result both are trying to advance 
their own agenda instead of becoming ―partners in government‖ (Zahar, 2013, p.76) and 
working together for the benefit of the country. For March 14, the main justification 
stated is the imbalance of power caused by the fact that Hezbollah is able to use its arms 
to gain more leverage in decision-making. For example, after the July War, March 14 
―accused Hezbollah of building a state-within-the-state and of standing as the major 
obstacle to the reinforcement of state institutions‖ (Zahar, 2013, p.76). As for Hezbollah, 
they accused March 14 ―of colluding with the enemy‖ (Zahar, 2013, p.76). This 
polarization culminated in 2008 as Hezbollah fighters took the streets of Beirut 
following the government‘s decision to take apart its communication networks. 
According to Amal Hamdan, ―the swiftness of the takeover was perceived as a 
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humiliating defeat for the Sunnis and Hizbollah had demonstrated it held the military 
and political balance of power in Lebanon‖ (Hamdan, 2013, p.53). The bloody clashes in 
Beirut and in the mountains ended by a Qatari brokered deal, known as the Doha 
Agreement, which was backed by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the U.S. (Hamdan, 
2013).  
Under the auspice of the Qatari leadership and sponsored by the League of Arab States, 
the Lebanese political leaders from both camps met in Doha in the aim of ending the 18 
months political stalemate between the majority led by March 14 and the opposition led 
by March 8. The leaders that gathered in Qatar to discuss the future of Lebanon included 
the heads of political parties such as Amine Gemayel representing the Phalangist party, 
Samir Geagea representing the Lebanese Forces, Nabih Berri representing the Amal 
party, Saad Hariri representing the Future Movement, Walid Jumblatt representing the 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Michel Aoun representing the Free Patriotic 
Movement (FPM) and a representative of Hassan Nassrallah from Hezbollah (Mesarra, 
2009).  After days of negotiations, an agreement was reached on 21 May 2008 and was 
publicized through a statement issued by Hamad bin Jassem, a Qatari PM and Foreign 
Minister. The agreement stipulated the election of a consensus president, the formation 
of a national agreement cabinet, and reaching agreement on a new electoral law. It also 
had practical results such as reaching an agreement on refraining from resorting to the 
use of weapons to resolve conflicts (Now Lebanon, 2008).  
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Although the fourth clause of this agreement stipulated that the National dialogue 
between these leaders continues ―under the aegis of the president as soon as he is 
elected‖ (Now Lebanon, 2008, art.4), the agreement as a whole did not retain any clause 
related to reconciliation between the conflicting factions or justice for the victims of the 
violent events that took place, thus granting impunity to the perpetrators of these events. 
Once again, a peace agreement for Lebanon was brokered by external forces, and just 
like the Taif, the Lebanese leaders agreed on a power sharing arrangement favoring their 
political gains over reconciliation and justice. Academics such as Paul Salem and Amal 
Ghorayeb were cautious in their reaction to this agreement. Although Doha had a 
positive effect in the sense that it broke the political stalemate that Lebanon was in, 
Salem feared that ―it will not resolve the basic contradictions, because there are two 
states, the state itself and Hezbollah which is another state, and this will not change 
before the regional situation has changed" (AlJazeera, 2008, para.2). From her side, 
Ghorayeb stated that ―this is a compromise between the government and the opposition; 
a settlement, not a solution […] in no way does it address the real grievances that led to 
the current crisis" (AlJazeera, 2008, para.2).  
4.2.4. National Dialogue  
Following the deep political rifts between the main political blocs in Lebanon, caused by 
the Syrian withdrawal, the Lebanese political leaders convened in 2006 to launch an 
initiative called the National Dialogue. These leaders were representatives of 14 political 
groups and included Aoun (FPM), Nassrallah (Hezbollah), Berri (Amal), Jumblatt 
(PSP), Hariri (Future Movement), Geagea (LF), Gemayel (Phalangists) and prime 
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minister at the time Fouad Sanyoura (Future Movement), most of whom were also key 
actors during the war. The aim of this National Dialogue was to ―discuss pressing issues 
that have divided the Lebanese political scene since the February 14, 2005 assassination 
of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri‖ (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
[CEIP], 2008, p. 2). Several meetings were held throughout 2006, as a result of which 
the group reached consensus on four main issues: normalizing the relations with Syria 
by establishing a Syrian embassy in Lebanon and a Lebanese embassy in Syria, the 
delineation of the borders with Syria, removing the Palestinians arms outside the 
Palestinian camps and the need to find a replacement candidate for the presidency, 
which was headed by Emile Lahoud, a pro-Syrian figure (Schenker, 2006).  
The discussions were halted in late 2006, due to the eruption of the 2006 War with 
Israel, and were then resumed in 2008 with the formation of a National Dialogue 
Committee headed by President Michel Suleiman (Presidency of the Republic of 
Lebanon [PRL], 2010). The Committee included the above-mentioned leaders, in 
addition to MPs and Ministers representing the full spectrum of Lebanese politics (PRL, 
2010).  The talks gave birth to the Baabda Declaration of June 11, 2012, consisting of 17 
clauses. Its main elements tackle the issues of preserving the security of Lebanon, 
reinforcing the culture of dialogue and coexistence, maintaining civil peace, 
strengthening state institutions, supporting the Lebanese army and the judiciary to be 
able to enforce the law and neutralizing Lebanon from regional conflicts (PRL, 2012). 
This declaration was later officially adopted by the UN and the League of Arab States 
and was described by the president as ―an inclusive political framework that can unite 
73 
 
sincere efforts aimed at safeguarding this nation‘s sovereignty and unity‖ (Dakroub, 
2013, para.3).  
Although the Baabda declaration seems to be a positive achievement at first glance, 
upon closer examination its considerable weaknesses are revealed. First and foremost, 
the Baabda declaration was never implemented even by the parties who prepared it, 
especially with regard to the disassociation of Lebanon from regional conflicts; the 
ongoing involvement of Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict and its subsequent impact on 
the neutrality and security of Lebanon is perhaps the most glaring example of this. In 
May 2013, Hassan Nassrallah, the head of Hezbollah, officially declared that his party 
will stand by the regime and ―would fight alongside Assad to prevent Syria falling "into 
the hands" of Sunni jihadi radicals, the United States and Israel […] as the very survival 
of the Shi'ites was at stake‖ (Nakhoul, 2013, para.4). This unilateral involvement of 
Hezbollah in the Syrian conflict shattered the very foundation of the Baabda declaration 
by undermining Lebanon‘s neutrality and its disassociation from regional conflicts. It 
has further been argued that the military involvement of the Party of God in Syria 
backfired as Lebanon‘s security became threatened and it ―heightened precarious Sunni-
Shi‘a tensions‖ (Nerguizian, 2013, para.2).  
Secondly, although the declaration stresses the need for coexistence and dialogue 
between Lebanese in order to guarantee civil peace, it fails to provide any suggestions or 
details as to how such coexistence and dialogue is to be achieved – it does not contain 
specific reconciliation efforts Lebanon should engage in, which is why the country has 
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not only failed to achieve social reconciliation but has also witnessed a rise in sectarian 
tensions since June 2012.  In terms of judicial reform, the declaration mentions the 
importance of supporting the judiciary in fairly imposing the provisions of the law 
without discrimination but once again fails to provide any details as to how such support 
and reforms are to be implemented.  
These reconciliation efforts are not exhaustive and do not include all the efforts that 
were undertaken by the government throughout the post war period. They do, however, 
represent a sample of the most important but ultimately unsuccessful efforts that were 
led by the government in an effort to maintain peace and stability in the country. What is 
interesting about these initiatives is that they all fail to address the issue of the 
accountability of the perpetrators, thereby reinforcing the culture of impunity, which 
they nevertheless at least purport to be addressing. Also, all of the efforts outlined above 
are between members of ruling elite, many of whom were warlords during the civil war, 
without any representation of victim groups or individuals or even organizations from 
the grassroots level. Like the Taif Agreement, the Doha Agreement consisted of a 
reconciliation and power sharing agreement between the leaders, ignoring the needs of 
Lebanese society and citizens. Both of these agreements also contributed to changing the 
balance of power in Lebanese politics as Hezbollah, with military capabilities commonly 
considered to be stronger than those of the Lebanese State, gained a seat in government 
whilst also maintaining its ability to take unilateral action in matters of war and peace.  
This approach to peace and reconciliation in Lebanon has proven to be more anesthesia 
than a long-term solution, as is evident from the sectarian conflicts and struggles that 
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were once again revived during the May 2008 confrontations and continue to this day. 
Khoury and Ghosn argue that the causes of these relapses are to be found in the 
unsuccessful efforts of reconciliation through which ―the root causes of the war, as well 
as the abuses created by the war, have not been confronted‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, 
p.386).  
Having examined official, government-led reconciliation efforts, the following section 
will assess some of the official, government-led transitional justice measures in an effort 
to assess whether they have been any more successful in making amends for past 
injustices. 
4.3. Transitional Justice Efforts   
As mentioned earlier, the Taif Agreement, followed by the General Amnesty Law, 
purposely failed to tackle the issue of justice for the victims of the war as it paved the 
way for the warlords to become the political elite. It was not in the interest of those 
newly emerged politicians to open up the debate on national reconciliation or the doors 
for retributive justice to take place, because they knew they would be among the first to 
be targeted. Thus, transitional justice was totally absent during the first phase of the 
post-war settlement.  
4.3.1. Reparations Program 
Due to the restrictions posed by the Amnesty law, a campaign of trials for the 
perpetrators of the war (and war crimes) was inconceivable. However, the need for 
transitional justice extended beyond assigning guilt for crimes committed during the 
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war, in particular to the internally displaced people (IDP) and the missing.  During the 
Lebanese conflict and the abuses committed by different parties based on confessional 
lines, around 800 000 Lebanese, or 30% of the population, were displaced. After the end 
of the conflict, around 450 000 Lebanese, comprising around 90 000 families, were still 
considered as displaced. The displacement hit most of the Lebanese territory but some 
regions were affected more than others; 62% were from Mount Lebanon, 7.7% 
originated from Beirut, 23.8% came from the South and 2.3% were from the Bekaa 
(United Nations Development Program, 1997, p. 2). In an effort to tackle the immense 
challenge posed by the vast number of IDPs, the Taif stipulated ―the right of the 
displaced Lebanese to return to the place from which they were displaced‖ (Kanafi-
Zahar, 2012, p.46). Thus, in 1992 the government set up the Ministry of the Displaced 
and the Central Fund for the Displaced mandated ―to ensure the return of all displaced 
people and to pay indemnities to them as applicable‖ (Kanafi-Zahar, 2012, p.46).  
The official purpose of this ministry was ―to deal with conflicts between squatters and 
former owners and even, as in the case of the Shuf, the repatriation of whole villages‖ 
(Haugbolle, 2010, p. 70). Ironically, or perhaps on purpose, this ministerial portfolio was 
assigned to Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader of the PSP, who was responsible for most 
of the Christian displacement that took place in the Shuf area (Haugbolle, 2010, p.70). 
This ministry was accused of corruption and inefficiency as the allocated budget was 
overspent without resolving the issue of the displaced. Elias Bejjany describes this 
process as a ―political bazaar‖ in which the government spent around $800 million since 
the establishment of this ministry until 1999 in the aim of helping the displaced, 
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however ―90 percent of this money was distributed to those who inflicted the 
displacement and not to the displaced victims themselves‖ (Bejjany, 1999).  
Numbers show that from 1991 until 1999, $800 million were spent and only 20% of the 
displaced returned to their towns and communities from which ―9% were fully 
reimbursed for expenditure on house reconstruction, and the great majority of returnees 
having to pay for reconstruction from private funds‖ (Assaf & El-Fil, 2000, p.32). 
According to Assaf and El-Fil, the exertion of the return plan of the displaced was not 
only characterized by the embezzlement of funds and ―blatant mismanagement‖, it was 
also known for ―the lack of coordination between the Ministry of the Displaced and the 
ministries in charge of infrastructure and social services‖ (Assaf & El-Fil, 2000, p.32). 
In fact, in regions where the infrastructure was lacking, the displaced were given the 
money in cash to rebuild their houses, whereas in the regions where infrastructure was 
available, funds were not given for restoration and construction. Thus, some displaced 
decided to rebuild their homes from their own funds as they did not receive money from 
the ministry, while others who did get the funds, cheated the system and decided not to 
return to their villages or rebuild their homes, but rather to use the money for other 
purposes (Assaf & El-Fil, 2000, p.32). Due to the lack of transparency in dealing with 
the issue of the displaced, there are no reliable statistics regarding the exact number of 
displaced that returned to their villages, however, according to the United States 
Committee for Refugees and Immigrants report published in 1999, ―the pace of return 
has been slow and most of the displaced have not returned‖ (United States Committee 
for Refugees and Immigrants, 1999, para.16).  
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4.3.2. Truth Commissions  
The missing, of which it is estimated there are some 17,000, is another group the 
government was unwilling to look into in the first phase of ―peace‖. In 1991, after an 
exchange of prisoners between the Lebanese Forces and Hizbollah, Michel Murr, the 
Minister of Defense at the time, declared that there were no more detainees with the 
political parties and that the people that were released were the last of the detained 
(Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p. 93). This statement was not very well received by the families 
of the disappeared whose beloved were still missing either in Lebanon or in the Syrian 
and Israeli prisons. After considerable pressure from civil society, three official 
commissions were set up by the government to look into the issue of the disappeared, 
but to no avail. 
The first commission, created in 2000 under the Hoss government, was set to ―Resolve 
the matter of the Disappeared‖. The work of this commission was severely criticized as 
it was composed solely of security officials and did not include any representatives of 
the families of the victims (Saghieh, 2012).  Furthermore, only a two-page summary of 
the final report was released to the public, and that denied the presence of any Lebanese 
detainees in Israel or Syria; a claim which was proved wrong after only four years when 
54 Lebanese were released by the Syrian authorities and 23 by the Israeli authorities in 
2004 (Lebanese Center for Human Rights [CLDH], 2008).  The report also concluded, 
that ―all persons who were kidnapped or reported as missing, whose disappearance dates 
back to four years or longer, and whose bodies were not found, have been declared as de 
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facto deceased‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.30). This in particular was strongly rejected by the 
families and supporters of the families of the missing.  
After the failure of the first commission to provide any substantial information on the 
fate of the disappeared, a second commission was established a year later, in 2001, to 
look into the case of ―disappeared for whom there are reasons to believe that they are 
still alive‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.30). Headed by Fouad Saad, Minister of State for 
Administrative Reform at that time, it was tasked with ―collecting requests by citizens 
who wish to enquire about their missing relatives whom they believe to be still alive‖ 
(CLDH, 2008, p.30). The work of this commission once again proved to be futile as it 
was not able to prepare a report of its findings and its mandate did not include looking 
into ―the executions that took place in Lebanon, Syria and Israel, nor to demand the 
return of the bodies of the missing‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.30). Furthermore, it placed the 
burden ―to prove that their kidnapped were still alive‖ on the shoulders of the families 
rather than the commission itself (CLDH, 2008, p.30).   
Many scholars have argued that both of these commissions were doomed to fail from the 
outset, because Lebanon was suffering from the Syrian occupation. According to 
Haugbolle, the political and the practical situation in Lebanon made such efforts 
inconceivable; Lebanon was unlikely to be the pioneer of such processes in the Arab 
world as it lacked both political will and the international pressure to pursue such efforts. 
Haugbolle adds that ―it was inconceivable for the initiative to be endorsed by Syria, an 
authoritarian state without political transparency whose main interest was to keep its 
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Lebanese allies in power‖ (Haugbolle, 2010, p.71). Therefore, following the Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, civil society in Lebanon again pushed for a 
commission of inquiry, hoping that the obstacle of the Syrian presence would no longer 
hinder such a process.   
In 2005, a joint Lebanese-Syrian commission was created to ―investigate the Lebanese 
missing in Syria and the Syrians missing in Lebanon‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.31). Although the 
Syrian obstacle was theoretically out of the way, the work of this commission was 
severely criticized by civil society and was not considered as a ―genuine commission of 
inquiry‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.31): the Lebanese part of this commission was to provide the 
Syrians with lists of names of those detained in Syria, without the ability to engage in 
further investigations, whereas the Syrians denied that these individuals were detained in 
Syrian prisons (CLDH, 2008).     
These three government-led initiatives failed as the families of the missing still do not 
have any clear information about the fates and whereabouts of their missing relatives. 
Even after the Syrian withdrawal, the joint commission proved to be unsuccessful as it 
failed to make a genuine effort at providing justice for the missing. A report by the 
Lebanese Center for Human Rights, which studied the work of these commissions, 
concluded that ―the manner in which they conducted their inquiries raise serious doubts 
about whether their objective was to really get at the truth‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.32). The 
report goes on to say that the inefficiency of these processes contributed to a lack of trust 
in the state by the families of the missing and ―reinforced their conviction that the 
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Lebanese authorities have never had any intention of uncovering the fate of their 
―disappeared‖ relatives‖ (CLDH, 2008, p.32).  
Frustrated by the government‘s unwillingness to disclose information or even actively 
work on the issue of the missing, persistent demands and active lobbying by Lebanese 
civil society concerned with the issue of the missing and disappeared played a very 
important role in moving the issue forward. In 2009 civil society, represented mainly by 
The Committee of the Families of the Kidnapped and Disappeared in Lebanon as well as 
Support of Lebanese in Detention and Exile (SOLIDE), filed two lawsuits, the first one 
aimed at requesting state protection for two mass graves that were revealed in the report 
of the commission set up in 2000, and the second one aimed at presenting the full report 
of this commission before the Shura Council, known as the State Council (ICTJ, 2014, 
p.16). Although the State Council did not issue any decision at the time, it recently gave 
a flare of hope to the families by issuing a decision in early March 2014 in which it 
recognized the right of the families to know and have full access to the report of the 
2000 commission (El Hassan, 2014). However, families and concerned civil society 
activists remain skeptical about the decision: according to Nizar Saghieh, ―the decision 
is a major achievement, but we cannot confirm if the state will abide by it, […] It is 
difficult to get the authorities to implement the Shura Council decision; we cannot force 
the state to commit to the ruling‖ (El Hassan, 2014, para.2). 
Through their advocacy and lobbying campaigns, local civil society also developed a 
―draft law for the missing and disappeared persons‖ to be used as a lobbying tool in their 
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quest to uncover the fate of their loved ones. The draft law, published in 2012, defined 
the terms ―missing‖ and ―forcibly disappeared‖ based on internationally recognized 
definitions. It also demanded the establishment of an investigative bureau or body to 
inspect the whereabouts of the missing as well as the creation of a Public National 
Commission, among others (ICTJ, 2013). In return, the Minister of Justice at the time, 
Chakib Kortbawi, issued a draft decree stipulating the creation of commission that will 
examine ―the case of the disappeared‖ (ICTJ, 2014, p. 18). However, due to the 
resignation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati in 2013, the decree has yet to be adopted or 
developed further.  
4.3.3. Geagea Trials  
Following the bombing of Notre Dame de Deliverance, a church in Jounieh, The LF 
leader, Samir Geagea was detained with members of the LF and accused of the 
bombing. During the interrogations, the ―examining magistrate‖ claimed to have 
evidence suggesting that the LF leader was involved in the killing of Dani Chamoun, the 
leader of the Liberal National Party (LNP) and his family in the early nineties (AI, 
2004). Geagea was referred to the Justice Council and sentenced to life imprisonment in 
the case of Dany Chamoun. Geagea defense lawyers argued that the killing of Chamoun 
falls within the general amnesty law. However, the Justice Council dismissed their 
argument on the grounds that it was the assassination of a political leader and as such 
exonerated from the amnesty law (AI, 2004).  
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Following the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Geagea along with Islamists who were 
involved in the Dunnieh and Majdel Anjar clashes with the army in 2000 were granted 
an Amnesty. From reviewing these trials and the Amnesty law of 2005, one can 
conclude that first, although AI described the trial of Geagea as unfair and politically 
motivated (AI, 2004), it nevertheless proves that trials of political leaders are possible, 
given sufficient political will. Having said that, resorting to amnesty once again revived 
the culture of impunity in Lebanon; as Saghieh notes, it is this very impunity developed 
for the warlords that hinders any future attempts at restorative justice (Kanafi-Zahar, 
2011, p.39). He goes on to argue that that the main reason for amnesty being granted to 
both Geagea and the Islamists – for two unconnected crimes – lies in the logic of the 
sectarian system and that ―the deputies consider that it is not possible to give privileges 
to Christians without giving the same ones to the Muslims‖ (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011, p.39). 
When assessing the impact of these transitional justice initiatives, one can only conclude 
that they were unsuccessful and at least partially flawed already by design. With regard 
to the missing, efforts undertaken lacked genuine intent and ―seriousness‖ on the part of 
the government and failed to provide closure to the families of the missing (CLDH, 
2008). With regard to the internally displaced, the reparations program initiated by the 
government was not fruitful as ―the plight of the displaced was still far from being 
resolved‖ (Leenders, 2012, p.65). Finally, the Geagea trials were accused of being 
impartial and politically motivated (AI, 2004) and the amnesty that followed in 2005 
reasserted the culture of impunity. The reasons behind the failure of these initiatives can 
be traced back to several key elements. Firstly, as the warlords became politicians as a 
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result of the Taif Accord, it was not in their personal interest to reveal for example the 
fate of the missing, because their militias were largely responsible for the missing in the 
first place and ―because some of those who ordered the kidnappings were now in the 
government‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.394).  Revealing such information would 
jeopardize their positions and the state of ―collective amnesia‖ that they were trying to 
institute (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011). Secondly, the Syrian government, which had effectively 
assumed tutelage of Lebanon after the cessation of hostilities, was not interested in 
promoting reconciliation among the different Lebanese factions, as that would loosen its 
grip on the country (Leenders, 2012). Ghosn and Khoury argue that ―so long as the 
Lebanese remained fragmented, the Syrians could make the argument that their presence 
sustained the peace between different factions‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.391).  
Thirdly, political corruption is a major reason for the failure of the reparations program; 
on the basis of investigations by internal and international organizations such as the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the reparations program was filled with 
―corruption in the form of political patronage, favoritism, and bribery‖, which 
contributed to undermining its results (Leenders, 2012, p.65).  
Building on these observations, the next section will examine how the post-war 
settlements that took place undermined the rule of law in Lebanon and contributed to the 
rise of political corruption and the culture of impunity, as well as the reoccurrence of 
violence.  
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4.4. Effect of Post-War Settlements on the Rule of Law  
Due to the official policies of forgetfulness, such as the general Amnesty law and the 
unresolved consequences of the war, the Lebanese have been characterized as living in a 
state of ―social amnesia‖ and ―civil war denial‖ (Burgis-Kasthala, 2013, p. 501). The 
Taif Agreement, which was supposed to end the confessional system, served instead to 
exasperate sectarianism as political offices were once again distributed according to 
sects (Leenders, 2012). In fact, ―by reinstitutionalizing the sectarian divisions in the 
political system, it further perpetuated inequalities and differences‖ and thus, it did not 
touch on the ―issue of structural violence‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p. 389).  The 
Amnesty laws of 1991 led to the idolization of warlords who came to be celebrated as 
heroes (Kanafi-Zahar, 2011). It also laid the ground for a culture of impunity because it 
failed to account for the war crimes and human rights abuses of the war (Kanafi-Zahar, 
2011). Put together, these factors contributed to undermining the rule of law in Lebanon. 
In order to demonstrate how this happened, this section will first analyze the new image 
given to the warlords and how communitarianism replaced the state. It will then examine 
in some more detail the political corruption which has ravaged Lebanon‘s state 
institutions after the war. Finally, it will examine the reoccurrence of violence in 
Lebanon.  
4.4.1. From Warlords to War Heroes 
As a perhaps unintended result of the redistribution of power brought about by the Taif 
Agreement, sectarianism and confessionalism were reinforced, leading to a heightened 
sense of ―loyalty to the sect or sectarian or political leader [za’im] and not to the 
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country‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.388). Thus, the sectarian identity emerged as more 
dominant and ―important than the national one‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.388). This 
sense of sectarianism coupled with a ―state sponsored amnesia‖, delayed or stood in the 
way of establishing a unified history of the war. In fact, history books following the 
Lebanese curriculum end in 1943 when Lebanon gained its independence; from that 
time onwards there have been failed efforts to put together a unified narrative of the war 
(Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p.392). Thus, each sect retained its own narrative of the war 
and some of the militia leaders became ―heroes‖ for their sects and their community 
(Kanafi-Zahar, 2011), able to justify their role in the war as well as their continued role 
in the post-war period ―whether by past communal victimization, the threat of future 
communal victimization, or the invocation of a unique communal mission‖ (Arthur, 
2011, p. 274). As a result, many individuals belonging to these sects are themselves not 
interested in changing the status quo, as they fear doing so would adversely affect their 
lives and future prospects. 
Those war ―heroes‖ were able to assert themselves and to provide for the needs of their 
communities as they gained power from their transition into politicians. In fact, they 
were able to put the interests of their communities above those of society as a whole 
(Kanafi-Zahar, 2011).  As the state institutions were crumbling after the end of the war, 
these war heroes, with their new governmental positions ―replaced unifying public 
institutions as the basis of government and social services‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.1). In terms 
of rebuilding the state, Adwan argues that ―distributing state assets and institutions 
among as many of the warlords as possible was the interpretation of national 
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reconciliation adopted after the war‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.2). With these arrangements, 
political corruption in rebuilding the Lebanese state became rampant and these newly 
emerged politicians were able to ―control public and private foreign aid‖ which ―gave 
them exceptional leverage to broaden their clientele and thus to renew their legitimacy‖ 
(Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p. 391).   
4.4.2. Political Corruption in State Institutions  
According to Leenders, political corruption is defined as ―the use or abuse of public 
office for private gain‖ (Leenders, 2012, p.9). The roots of political corruption in post-
war Lebanon have been outlined above; during the war, institutions parallel to state 
institutions such as the treasury and other administrations were built to ―fulfill the needs 
of more warlords and militias‖ (Adwan, 2004, p. 2).   
The Taif Agreement reshaped the power structure of the country, as the Council of 
Ministers was granted executive powers. This new system, built with the aim of 
guaranteeing the ―representation and participation of all parties in the decision-making 
process‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.2), was in reality replaced by a ―Troika System‖ that was 
comprised of the three top ranking positions in the country: the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament. According to Adwan, this 
new arrangement ―led to deadlocks, prompting calls for the intervention of Syria, the 
main power broker on the Lebanese political scene‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.2).     
Also, due to the post war political settlement, the watchdogs of the state institutions 
were very weak as they were politically controlled. Watchdog agencies such as the 
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Central Inspection Board (CIB) and the Courts of Accounts (CA), were pressured by 
politicians ―to refrain from taking disciplinary actions against public servants or from 
revealing administrative irregularities‖ (Leenders, 2012, p.164). Moreover, after the war, 
these agencies were unable to pursue their mandate properly as they were short in 
human resources. For example, in 1998, the CIB had only 90 inspectors expected to 
monitor all of the civil administration, a job that required at least 300 inspectors to carry 
out properly (Leenders, 2012, p.165). These vacant positions were due to ―the inability 
of the troikists to agree on candidates‖ (Leenders, 2012, p.165) which also affected the 
senior positions of these agencies, which were left without management for long periods 
of time. Even once agreement was reached on candidates, positions were often given to 
civil servants who did not pose a threat to any member of the Troika (Leenders, 2012). 
This heavy political interference and the lack of staff left the transactions undertaken by 
state institutions and ministries without control or auditing. Sometimes, the work of 
these agencies was halted due to political pressure, and, at other times, politicians used 
them for the purposes of ensuring political gain over their opponents. For instance, 
during the Hoss cabinet at the time when Emile Lahoud was the president, the latter was 
―accused of prompting the CIB and CA to pursue and discredit Hariri and his allies with 
allegations of corruption in order to forestall their return to power‖ (Leenders, 2012, 
p.166).   
The Constitutional Council is another example of a dismantled watchdog institution. 
Established in 1994, based on the reforms suggested in the Taif, the Council is mandated 
―to supervise the constitutionality of laws and arbitrate conflicts that arise from 
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parliamentary and presidential elections‖ (The Lebanese Constitution, 1995, art.19). In 
other words, it serves to ensure that laws are constitutional and legal and to ensure that 
politicians do not overstep the authority given to them by the constitution. The Council 
is, however, incapacitated as it is subjugated to severe politicization, which limits its 
efficiency in supervising the constitutionality of legislation, thus weakening the rule of 
law.  According to Dr. Mohammad Mograby, ―the Council itself is badly structured as 
largely a barrier against the defenders of the constitution and is stuffed by personal 
friends and allies of powerful politicians‖ (Mograby, 2005, para.5). This political 
manipulation of the Council was evident in 2013, when President Michel Suleiman as 
well as the head of the FPM, Michel Aoun, challenged a law presented by the parliament 
to extend its mandate for another 17 months. This law, which was supposed to be 
rejected by the Council members for its unconstitutionality, was instead passed as 
members of the Council failed to reach quorum in four consecutive sessions. This act 
was highly criticized by media outlets such as An-Nahar, a renowned Lebanese 
newspaper, which highlighted the political interference behind this lack of quorum and 
reported ―that the council‘s two Shiite and one Druze members have been boycotting the 
session as per a political agreement between Speaker Nabih Berri and Progressive 
Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblatt to prevent the challenge to the parliament 
extension from being approved‖ (Now, 21 June 2013, para.6). This incident of political 
manipulation of the Constitutional Council is one of many examples of the abuse of 
power and political corruption of the Lebanese governance. It further demonstrates how 
the institutions concerned with upholding the rule law are rendered incapable of playing 
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their constitutional role and manipulated instead for different political ends, thus further 
undermining the rule of law and accountability.  
With the absence of checks and balances by these two official state watchdogs, the CIB 
and the CA, as well as the political manipulation of the Constitutional Council, political 
corruption ran rampant in state institutions. The cost of political corruption did not only 
affect the Lebanese economy, but also the citizens who ―surrender the freedom of 
choice‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.4). These citizens ―give up their right to hold their officials 
accountable and become enslaved by them in return of services‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.4). 
Adwan also argues that in the case of Lebanon, corruption was seen as ―the cost of 
peace, reconciliation, reconstruction and politics in general‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.4). 
Although the presence of corruption in Lebanese state institutions such as the Ministry 
of Health and the Ministry of the Displaced was widely known by the political elites as 
well as the people, no real efforts were made to hold the perpetrators responsible or 
accountable. In fact, in 1998, ―members of the same cabinet would accuse each other of 
chronic corruption, embezzlement, and abuse of authority‖ (Adwan, 2004, p.4), but none 
of those accused were held accountable. This lack of accountability reinforced the 
culture of immunity and impunity established by the Amnesty law; Ghosn and Khoury 
argue that ―the amnesty law directly or indirectly ended up playing a role in hindering 
the post-conflict process because there was no accountability and no reason for changes 
in behavior‖ (Khoury & Ghosn, 2011, p. 391).   
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4.4.3. Reoccurrence of Violence     
Although the war officially ended after the Taif Agreement, Lebanon has witnessed a 
series of external and internal violence throughout the post war period. Externally, 
Israel‘s war on Lebanon continued as Hezbollah and the Palestinian militias were still 
armed due to being excluded from the disarmament strategy stipulated in the Taif. In the 
nineties, Israel launched two operations targeting Lebanon: ―Operation Accountability‖ 
in 1993 and ―Operation Grapes of Wrath‖ in 1996 (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.123). 
After Israel‘s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, it waged a 33-day full-scale ―July 
War‖ targeting not only the southern parts of Lebanon, but most of its territory in July 
2006, in response to an attack and kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah 
(Knudsen & Yassin, 2012). The consequences of this war affected not only Lebanese 
citizens and infrastructure directly targeted by the war, but also had a negative impact at 
the political level. Knudsen and Yassin argue that ―the July War was not only a stark 
reminder of the devastation of the civil war, but deepened the country‘s political 
divisions and ultimately led to a governance crisis‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.125).  
Internally, throughout the mid-nineties and under the Syrian tutelage, the country was 
witnessing an increase of ―sectarian attacks on civilians, vendettas between rival 
Islamists groups and bombing of churches and other places of worship‖ (Knudsen & 
Yassin, 2012, p.122). Following the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Syria‘s presence in 
Lebanon was highly questioned and culminated in UNSC Resolution 1559 of 2004. This 
Resolution ―called for an immediate end to Syrian troop deployment and the 
disarmament of Hezbollah and Palestinian militias‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.124). 
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During this period, Lebanon was suffering from targeted assassinations of anti-Syrian 
politicians and journalists, which climaxed in 2005 when Rafik Hariri, a former Prime 
Minister, was killed. His murder, which the Syrians were accused of, split the country 
between two rival camps: the anti-Syrian March 14 group which called for Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon and the Pro-Syrian March 8 group which welcomed the 
presence of Syrian forces in the country. The rift between these two blocs widened due 
to the July War, for which Hezbollah was largely considered responsible, and the 
establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) to investigate the murder of 
Prime Minister Hariri. In fact, Knudsen and Yassin state that the STL ―divided the 
country and led to new outbreaks of violence‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.125). The 
tension between these two rival political groups left the country in a political deadlock, 
which culminated in the breaking out of violent clashes in Beirut and in the mountains in 
2008. As a result of this instability, confessionalism resurfaced in Lebanon and ―people 
retreated to their confession, their neighborhood and their families for reasons of safety, 
a safety the state could no longer guarantee‖ (Knudsen & Yassin, 2012, p.125). The 
Syrian conflict also had repercussions on Lebanon‘s fragile confessional system as 
clashes erupted in Tripoli along confessional lines between the Sunnis and Alawites. 
Sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shi‘aa also heightened due to Hezbollah‘s 
continuing military involvement in the Syrian conflict where the party is accused by 
many of ―killing Sunnis in Syria who are fighting their own government‖ (White, 2013, 
para.4).   
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This instability is often attributed to Lebanon being a ―weak state‖ (Zahar, 2012) 
penetrated by external powers that use it as proxy to fight their own wars (Hirst, 2010). 
Picard and Ramsbotham attribute Lebanon‘s vulnerability to its ―post-war cosmetic 
democracy‖, which according to them ―has left internal tensions vulnerable and sensitive 
to regional interests and instability – namely Syrian interference and Israeli armed threat 
and incursion‖ (Picard & Ramsbotham, 2012, p. 7). Makdisi agrees with Picard and 
Ramsbotham and stresses that this vulnerability is caused by the consociational 
democracy. He argues that ―Lebanon has been trapped by sectarian based 
consociationalism, which has rendered it greatly vulnerable to destabilizing outside 
shocks‖ (Makdisi & Marktanner, 2012, p.1).  
4.4.4. Rule of Law in Lebanon  
Having gone through the post war settlements and their effect on Lebanon in terms of 
instability and political corruption, it is clear that that these settlements also undermined 
the rule of law. The confessional system, deepened the sectarian tensions between 
different communities and, according to Hamd, ―was transformed from a mechanism for 
partnership and peaceful coexistence to a tool that compromises the prevalence of the 
law‖ (Hamd, 2012, p.1). Another factor that hindered the rule of law is the policies 
undertaken by consecutive governments after the war; Hamd argues that ―instead of a 
top down reform approach that strengthens and develops institutions to which the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers devolve‖ (Hamd, 2012, p.1), these policies 
focused on economic expansion and reconstructing the infrastructure.  Moreover, having 
an armed militia that is stronger than the state also obstructed the rule of law inasmuch 
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as the state was no longer able to claim monopoly over the use of force, assert its 
authority or control the actions of this armed group.  
Going back to Pekka Hallberg‘s definition of the rule law and its cornerstones, it can be 
argued that in Lebanon‘s case, these cornerstones are not very solid. With regard to the 
first cornerstone – ―the balanced separation of power‖ – contrary to the aspirations of the 
Lebanese constitution that ―The political system is established on the principle of 
separation, balance and cooperation amongst the various branches of government‖ 
(Lebanese constitution, Preamble, para. e), the actual situation is quite different. Hamd 
argues that ―the independence of the judiciary is limited to its duties, namely to the 
interpretation and application of the law, and the adjudication of disputes‖ (Hamd, 2012, 
p.2). As for the executive and legislative powers, Serhal argues that they are independent 
in theory but not in practice. He states that the ―complicit and often suspicious exchange 
of personal benefits between the government and the parliament distorted the 
constitutional principle of cooperation between the two powers, and conflict over 
personal and sectarian interests blurred the separating lines among them‖ (Hamd, 2012, 
para. 2).    
In terms of the ―implementation of fundamental and human rights‖, the second 
cornerstone (Hallberg, 2005, p.5), the revised Lebanese constitution reaffirms Lebanon‘s 
pledge to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Hamd, 2012). However, not all 
human rights are respected in this country. In terms of transitional justice, one of the 
basic rights, the right to know, is clearly not respected, as the fate of Lebanon‘s missing 
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is still unknown to this day. Research also shows that government initiatives to this end 
have been unsuccessful, futile and actually served to weaken trust in the government 
(CLDH, 2008). The rights of victims have been similarly neglected due to peace 
settlements that did not consider their needs – a factor further contributing to hindering 
the respect for human rights in Lebanon.  
As for the third cornerstone, ―performance of the system‖ (Hallberg, 2005, p.5), which 
Hallberg explains as resting on how citizens perceive their country functioning in terms 
of ―participation, legitimacy of decision making, and trust‖ (Hallberg, 2005, p.5), 
Lebanon‘s consociational democracy coupled with the Syrian tutelage, allowed the Syria 
to dictate ―the domestic politico-sectarian balance […] and how simmering political 
differences were to be resolved‖ (Makdisi & Marktanner, 2012, p. 4). Although the 
Syrians withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, they were still involved in its policy making 
and its security decisions. Najem argues that ―Syria‘s penetration of the security services 
was such that, at the very least, even if it was no longer calling for political shots, it was 
in a position to cause considerable instability in Lebanon should political developments 
become hostile to key Syrian interests‖ (Najem, 2012, p. 77). With Syria calling the 
shots in the internal affairs of Lebanon, and the patronage and clientelist system 
reinforced by the war, citizens lost their trust in the Lebanese government and turned to 
their confessional communities for services instead, resulting in a weak or even non-
existent third cornerstone.  
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Fourthly, regarding the ―principle of legality‖ or the ―conformity of the law‖ (Hallberg, 
2005. p.5), Lebanon‘s state institutions fail to conform with the law, are corrupt and 
have frequently been accused of embezzlement. The state‘s watchdogs have been 
paralyzed, corruption has grown rampant and accountability is lacking at all levels. The 
Amnesty law further undermined adherence to the laws as it reinforced the culture of 
impunity and downgraded accountability.  
4.5. Conclusions 
Lebanon‘s post-war settlements had a negative impact on the country‘s accountability 
process and lasting peace. The Taif, instead of paving the way for a reconciliation 
process between the communities, reaffirmed confessionalism and legitimated the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon, both of which hindered the fragile peace that Lebanon had. 
This was affirmed by the reoccurrence of internal violence throughout the post-war 
period, culminating in the events of 2008 as well as the current spillover from the Syrian 
war. The Amnesty law failed the victims of the war, denying them justice and 
reinforcing the culture of impunity in the country; not only were crimes against 
humanity not tried, but to make matters worse, the leading elite was able to get away 
with corruption and embezzlement even after the war. Lebanon became a penetrated 
country where regional powers fought conflicts through their Lebanese proxies. Instead 
of reforms aimed at strengthening the ability of state institutions to uphold the rule of 
law and revive the country, as was the case in Croatia, reforms were limited to 
revitalizing the economy and rebuilding the country and were notorious for the high 
levels of corruption involved. All of these factors contributed to a lack of trust in the 
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government, further exacerbated by the state‘s lack of monopoly over the use of arms. 
Hezbollah and Palestinians militias are still armed and the state lacks the power to 
control them or their use of arms. With the absence of efficient, accountable institutions 
and the unwillingness and inability of the government to establish its authority over all 
of its territory, Lebanon‘s rule of law continues to be undermined and the country‘s 
accountability process hindered. 
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Chapter Five 
Alternatives for Lebanon 
 
Although the destruction caused by a 15-year civil war has been horrific, Lebanon is not 
the only country to have gone through a destructive and divisive civil war – in fact, 
according to Sambanis, 146 civil wars have taken place between 1945 and 1999 
(Sambanis, 2004). Although every conflict and every country is unique, there are some 
common challenges countries face in a post-conflict situation, such as: how to deal with 
victims of human rights violations committed during the conflict; how to engage with 
the perpetrators of those violations; how to reconcile between the parties in conflict; and 
how to rebuild state institutions that were damaged by the conflict. The UN, which has 
increasingly been involved in the post-conflict reconciliation efforts of numerous 
countries emerging from internal conflict, has noted that ―the consolidation of peace in 
the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, 
cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be 
obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair 
administration of justice‖ (UNSC, 2004, para 2). As noted in Chapter II, the concept of 
transitional justice has emerged precisely as a result of academics and practitioners 
trying to put together some of the key elements that can help mend societies not 
physically but societally in the aftermath of a bloody transition or conflict.  
Chapter II provided a list of the key tools of transitional justice that are commonly 
considered in a post-conflict situation and that have proven to be successful in a number 
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of different contexts. These tools include: the prosecution of the perpetrators of human 
rights abuses to ensure accountability and justice for the victims; the establishment of 
truth commissions to look into the abuses that were committed and prevent their 
reoccurrences; symbolic or material reparations efforts for the victims to restore their 
dignity and redress the harm that they suffered; Institutional reform to address the 
structures of the system that allowed the human rights abuses to take place, and; vetting 
and dismissals targeting those individuals working in the public sector that were 
involved in inflicting human rights abuses.    
As Chapter III showed, in Croatia the consolidation of peace and rule of law has largely 
been achieved through the cooperation with the ICTY and judiciary reforms. However, 
the example of Croatia also showed that without a combination of a strong political will 
backed by international pressure, such initiatives would not have been possible – sadly, 
both internal political will and international pressure are currently missing in the case of 
Lebanon. 
Finally, Chapter IV then provided an inventory of transitional justice measures taken in 
Lebanon and an assessment of their relative successes, noting that none of them have 
really addressed past issues in an adequate manner or been implemented with the 
seriousness and follow-up necessary for achieving concrete results. The government led 
three commissions of inquiry about the fate of the missing, but none of them presented 
any practical results and the whereabouts of the missing are still unknown to their 
families. With regard to human rights violations committed by the perpetrators of the 
war, only one warlord, Samir Geagea, has been tried. Even his trial was only possible 
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because he was one of the opponents of the Syrian occupation governing Lebanon at the 
time. With regard to the Internally Displaced Persons, a Ministry for the Displaced was 
established but it failed to meet its primary purpose. Past efforts also clearly show that 
any transitional justice efforts directed towards bringing warlords to justice are bound to 
fail, as it is not in the interest of the warlords-come-politicians to undermine their own 
ability to remain in power. Rather than striving towards national reconciliation and 
justice after the war, through developing stronger institutions and processes that would 
encourage dialogue and reduce the risk of renewed conflict, the efforts implemented by 
leaders in Lebanon, in particular the Taif accord and the amnesty law, have in fact 
weakened the rule of law and accountability, thus paving the way for increased 
corruption and a high risk of renewed conflict. 
The Taif Accord was riddled with shortcomings and ill implementation, the effects of 
which are still palpable today. A new equal confessional formula was temporarily put in 
place between Christians and Muslims, and was to be followed later by the abolition of 
the confessional system. However, until this day, the sectarian system remains 
unchanged and, as Hassan Krayem puts is, ―leaves the door open to the renewal of 
conflict, and increases the possibilities of its occurrence‖ (Krayem, 1997, para. 39). In 
terms of political structure, Taif effectively delegated government sovereignty to Syria, 
legitimizing its tutelage over Lebanon and allowing it to favour its allies in Lebanon, 
thus weakening already damaged and fragile state institutions and increasing corruption. 
By failing to mention anything about the victims of war or justice for crimes committed, 
the accord allowed bloodstained warlords such as Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, to 
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name a few, to secure political gains instead of facing trials and to become heroes to 
their constituencies.    
The Amnesty law reinforced impunity and lack of accountability by exonerating the 
atrocities committed during the war. Coupled with the Taif Accord, it legitimized former 
warlords and helped in preserving the status quo in the country. Amnesty laws are 
usually given to perpetrators following a regime change, whereby these figures are no 
longer in positions of power. In the case of Lebanon, however, amnesty was given to the 
perpetrators who became heads of political parties and are still in power until this day – 
there was no regime change.  
Most importantly from the point of view of Lebanon‘s ability to rebuild society and 
democracy, the Taif Agreement and the Amnesty Law served to weaken and undermine 
the rule of law in Lebanon. As the prior analysis of the four pillars of the rule law 
showed, the lack of separation between powers and the political manipulation of 
Lebanon‘s judiciary weakened the country‘s independence and led to the lack of a 
culture of democracy. According to Mattar, for the Lebanese ―the law has become an 
instrument the regime uses for oppression and intimidation, instead of being a resource 
and a guarantee of rights‖ (Mattar, 2004, p.191).  Moreover, the absence of checks and 
balances for its already fragile state institutions has led the population to lose its trust in 
them. These challenges, in turn, lead to weak accountability, rampant corruption, and a 
high risk of conflict.  
It is clear, then, that the carrots and sticks that made it possible for Croatia to 
successfully implement transitional justice measures that promoted national healing and 
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strengthened the rule of law are not present in Lebanon, and therefore then that Lebanon 
is unlikely to be able to implement similar measures. In order to tackle the transitional 
challenges and strengthen the rule of law, which needs to be the foundation of building a 
just society and ―a fundamental principle embraced in most modern democracies‖ 
(Tommasoli, 2012, para.11), a different kind of approach to transitional justice would 
need to be adopted in Lebanon.  
Due to the fact that the main perpetrators of crimes against citizens during the civil war 
are currently the political leaders of the country, any future transitional justice efforts 
need to avoid targeting the warlords, through criminal trials and other such measures, 
and focus instead on tackling systemic injustices perpetuated through flawed state 
institutions as well as high the level of corruption hindering the rule of law. Such an 
approach should mainly target current legislation and government policies and should be 
based on a set of measures chosen specifically for their feasibility, practicality and 
potential for bringing about positive change. This is certainly not an easy task, but it is 
the aim of this study to identify some possible initiatives that would fulfill these criteria.  
This chapter will first develop criteria for assessing possible transitional justice efforts in 
Lebanon. Using these criteria, the latter part of the chapter will then seek to identify 
potential transitional justice measures that would fulfill the criteria developed and make 
recommendations for what could be done. 
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5.1.    Possible Transitional Justice Efforts in Lebanon 
The study of the Croatian case has shown that political will and international pressure 
are crucial for the successful implementation of transitional justice in the aftermath of an 
internal conflict. In Lebanon, where former warlords have been governing the country 
since the end of the war, are internationally recognized as legitimate leaders, and are 
supported by international actors more concerned with maintaining their influence in 
Lebanon than strengthening democracy and unity in the country, both are sadly lacking. 
Given that criminal prosecution of war criminals is not an option at the moment, this 
chapter will examine other possible transitional justice measures and initiatives, through 
which accountability and the rule of law in Lebanon could be enhanced.  
In order to be able to assess the value of different transitional justice tools and 
mechanisms, it is first necessary to establish criteria for assessing their feasibility, 
practicality and potential for positive change. The first and perhaps most important 
criterion has already been introduced above: given that there has been no regime change 
and that former warlords are still in power today, any tool or mechanism must be 
acceptable to them and therefore refrain from prosecuting them. It is important to note, 
however, that this does not mean that any tools or mechanisms must ignore the 
wrongdoings of the past; such an approach would simply lead to another Amnesty Law. 
Rather, it means that initiatives need to use the promise of refraining from criminal 
prosecutions as a bargaining tool for securing political support for less drastic 
transitional justice measures, such as legislative and institutional reform as well as more 
robust anti-corruption measures. 
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The second criterion is based on the likelihood that the initiative will positively affect 
the rule of law in Lebanon. The reason for this is that the rule of law has been identified 
as a key building block for democracy and improved governance as well as a key 
weakness in today‘s Lebanon. By strengthening the rule of law, transitional justice tools 
or mechanisms are more likely to have a snowball effect down the line, whereby they 
will bring about changes on which future initiatives can then build and bring about even 
more ambitious change. When exploring reform option, priority should be given to those 
reforms that seek to strengthen the rule of law.  
The third criterion is a practical one. Given that Lebanon is not a rich country and that 
currently there is no significant funding available for a transitional justice process in 
Lebanon, it is essential to try to identify tools and mechanisms that can achieve as much 
as possible for as little a cost as possible. This cost-effectiveness criteria will also 
consider the amount of people whose needs would be met by a given tool or mechanism.  
The fourth and final criteria is linked to the timeframe required to reach results by means 
of a given tool or mechanism. While acknowledging that it is extremely difficult to 
assess whether efforts that yield greater benefits after 20-30 years are more or less 
valuable than efforts that yield small benefits in 5 years or so, it is the starting point of 
this study that in the first instance it would be important to identify some ―low hanging 
fruit‖, which could build trust and confidence in transitional justice initiatives and thus 
encourage both decision-makers and citizens to commit to longer-term efforts.  
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These four criteria – political feasibility, impact on rule of law, economic viability and 
potential for quick wins – will be used to evaluate several legislative and institutional 
reform options available to Lebanon.  
5.1.1. Judicial Reform 
Judicial reform is considered to be part of the institutional reform pillar of transitional 
justice and aims at reforming the system that allowed for human rights atrocities to take 
place in the first place. A strong and independent judicial sector is also an important 
building block of rule of law: achieving justice through corrupt and politically-motivated 
courts is rarely possible. According to academics such as David Boies as well as 
practitioners such as the Chief Justice of Australia Sir Gerard Brennan, for the rule of 
law to strive in any society, the independence of the judiciary must be respected.  Sir 
Gerard Brennan states that ―the reason why judicial independence is of such public 
importance is that a free society exists only so long as it is governed by the rule of law – 
the rule which binds the governors and the governed, administered impartially and 
treating equally all those who seek its remedies or against whom its remedies are 
sought‖ (Brennan, 1996, para.2).   
In Lebanon, the independence of the judiciary is a misapprehension and exists only on 
paper due to political interference. According to Suleiman Takieddine, ―the 
independence of the judiciary in Lebanon is a mere illusion since the latter is no more 
than another administration open to the interference of politicians‖ (Takieddine, 2004, 
p.23). In Croatia, the impartiality and independence of the judicial system was achieved 
through amendments to the constitution relating to the appointment of judges (COE, 
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2011). In Lebanon, a reform of the judicial system would need to tackle not only the 
appointment of judges but also the degree of independence of the judicial system as a 
whole. Takieddine stresses the importance of independence as a cornerstone of 
democracy: he states that ―no democratic system can be considered sound without an 
independent judiciary to embody justice, to protect its legal foundations and to safeguard 
it against the manifold influences of power‖ (Takieddine, 2004, p.37).  
In Lebanon, reforms targeting the external and internal independence of the judiciary 
should be implemented. In terms of external independence, an external body with legal 
personality – independent of the executive branch – such as the Higher Council of the 
Magistrature, should take control of supervising the judiciary to make sure it functions 
properly. This body would have financial and administrative independence to exercise 
its power in terms of the appointment of judges, for example (Takieddine, 2004). In 
terms of internal independence, reforms should include the empowerment of scrutiny 
and control systems as well as the training of judges (Takieddine, 2004).      
A similar case for reform could also be made with regard to the Constitutional Council, 
which currently does not allow regular citizens to raise cases, is not mandated to assess 
the constitutionality of old laws, and is susceptible to political manipulation, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 4.4.2. In fact, Mograby argues that reforms related to 
expanding access to the Council, removing the time restriction regarding the eligibility 
of cases and revising the process of appointing members of the Council would go a long 
way towards strengthening constitutionality in Lebanon (Mograby, 2005).    
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In order to assess the potential of judicial reform, the proposed measures need to be 
considered in light of the criteria identified above. With regard to political feasibility, 
although the measures suggested may not be a high priority for the political elite and 
would weaken their ability to influence the judiciary, given that it has essentially already 
been agreed to as part of the Baabda declaration (which has never been implemented), it 
would seem to fulfill this criteria. Renewed efforts could build on the Baabda 
declaration and remind politicians about the importance of implementing the provisions 
regarding judicial reform. With regard to its ability to strengthen the rule of law, judicial 
reforms geared towards improving the professionalism and independence of the 
judiciary go to the very heart of rule of law. Takieddine‘s work reinforces this analysis 
by noting that ―there will be no rule of law unless the judicial power alone is the 
authority for the interpretation of the law and its impartial implementation, according to 
criteria and standards that the law itself determines, in order to confer legality and 
legitimacy on relations among people‖ (Takieddine, 2004, p.37). In terms of the cost-
effectiveness of judicial reform, although such reform is likely to involve increases in 
salaries and the setting up of new bodies, these costs are not above and beyond regular 
institutional reform and would certainly be worth the investment Finally, in terms of the 
timeframe of judicial reform, if implemented correctly it will yield visible results in the 
short term. Overall, then, judicial reform would be a viable and desirable measure to 
implement. 
5.1.2. Security Sector Reform 
Security Sector Reform goes hand in hand with transitional justice mechanisms and is 
considered by the UN to be part of the institutional reform mechanism which targets 
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―the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and 
oversight of security in a country‖ (UNGASC, 2008, p.5). Reforming the security sector, 
including law enforcement agencies, such as the police, aims at increasing accountability 
and strengthening the rule of law. According to the Commission of the European 
Communities, the objective of such reform ―is to contribute explicitly to strengthening 
of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and the 
efficient use of public resources‖ (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, p. 
6).  
With the political assassinations in Lebanon since 2004, recent bombings and clashes in 
Tripoli, the Hezbollah Israeli war in 2006, the Nahr Al Bared events of 2007 between 
Fateh al Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) , the May 2008 events, the recent 
sectarian incidents in Tripoli as well as the security threats resulting from the spillover 
of the Syrian war , the security sector – which mainly includes the LAF and the Internal 
Security Forces (ISF) – has been systematically weakened and lost much of its 
credibility in the eyes of the Lebanese people. According to Emile El-Hokayem and 
Elena McGovern, these security incidents ―increased the sense of insecurity of the 
general population and eroded its confidence in the ability of the state to prevent, 
counter and investigate acts of violence‖ (El-Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, p.8). These 
challenges are increased by other, broader, factors such as armed non-state actors 
(including Hezbollah and Palestinian factions) not answerable to the government, which 
hinder the state‘s authority over the monopoly of weapons and border control. More 
specifically, these challenges also include ―the Army‘s lack of fundamental systems and 
supplies‖ (El-Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, p.18) as well as the lack of trust in the ISF 
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in general as ―it suffers from severe image problems‖ (El-Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, 
p.18).  
The challenges indicated above show that Lebanon is facing challenges with regard to 
most if not all of the five key features of an effective and accountable security sector, 
identified by the UN:  
1. A legal and/or constitutional framework for the use of force in accordance with 
human rights norms and standards; 
2. An institutionalized system of governance, management and oversight; 
3. Mechanisms for coordination and cooperation among different security actors; 
4. The capacity of to provide effective security in terms of structures, personnel, 
equipment and resources; 
5. Culture of service and key values, such as promoting unity, integrity, discipline, 
impartiality and respect for human rights, guide the way security actors carry out 
their work (UNGASC, 2008, p.6).  
The first three features could be considered elements that would need to be addressed at 
the macro level, whereas the last two would need to be addressed at the micro level.  
With regard to challenges at the macro level, addressing them would require 
comprehensive reform. According to El-Hokayem and McGovern, however, this is not 
possible at the moment due to the level of politicization of issues such as border security 
and armed non-state groups, as well as the continuing internal conflict in Syria. They 
argue that engaging in comprehensive reform would require ―a better implementation of 
the Taif Agreement, a national security policy that defines the country‘s threats and 
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allies; [and] a national defense strategy which establishes an authority to manage and 
coordinate among the various security services‖ (El-Hokayem & McGovern, 2008, 
p.27).  
At a more micro level, on the other hand, some of the challenges facing the ISF and LAF 
could be tackled through means such as providing capacity building for the police force 
to be able to more effectively uphold law and order and earn the respect of the people as 
well as the armed forces in order to enhance their morale, authority and credibility. 
Training both security institutions to respect human rights and international best 
practices with regard to operating procedures may not address the fundamental flaws in 
the national framework within which they operate, but would go a long way towards 
improving their standing in the eyes of the people they are meant to serve and protect. 
In order to determine whether or not security sector reform would be a worthwhile 
transitional justice measure to pursue in Lebanon, the measures proposed above need to 
be assessed on the basis of the four criteria presented. First of all, it seems clear that 
macro level reforms (addressing features 1-3 in the list above) would not be feasible at 
this time, due to the political divisions which have only gotten deeper as a result of the 
Syrian crisis. Micro level reforms, focusing on building capacity as well as changing 
mindsets and organizational culture, on the other hand, are less politicized as they do not 
require political decision-making and would not only be feasible, but could actually help 
to mitigate some of the harmful effects of increased political polarization.  
In general, security sector reform is considered to be based on a principle of the primacy 
of the rule of law, meaning that the goal of security sector reform should be to ensure 
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that all entities (whether individuals or institutions), including the state, are accountable 
to publicly promulgated laws which are equally enforced and independently adjudicated 
in line with human rights norms and standards (see for example UNGASC, 2008; 
OECD, 2007; Sedra, 2010). As such, the training of security forces in, for example, 
human rights, the equal treatment of citizens, and an approach focused more on long-
term crime prevention rather than short-term reactionary measures would directly impact 
the rule of law. They would not only help improve accountability by upholding law and 
order with respect to human rights, but would also increase the trust of the Lebanese 
people in these public institutions.  
The cost of security sector reform greatly depends on the kind of reform envisaged: 
improving equipment or increasing salaries is more expensive whereas providing 
trainings, manuals or workshops is less so. In the case of Lebanon, a model could be 
found that would provide value for money, for example one consisting of incremental 
steps, depending on the availability of funds. With regard to the possibility of achieving 
quick wins through engaging in limited security sector reform in Lebanon, it must be 
noted that generally speaking security sector reform is a long-term process, although 
limited measures, such as trainings, could be implemented within the reasonably short-
term. 
Overall, the viability, usefulness and cost-effectiveness of security sector reform is a 
complex matter. On the one hand, it is clear that existing political divisions, lack of 
resources and a long timeframe mean that comprehensive security sector reform, which 
would have the biggest impact on the rule of law, is not possible at the moment in 
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Lebanon. On the other, limited, micro level measures that would target the behavior and 
mindsets of security sector employees would be feasible, less costly and could 
nevertheless have a positive impact on the rule of law; furthermore, they could even help 
address growing sectarian tensions in the country. 
5.1.3. Improving Accountability of State Institutions 
Traditionally, transitional justice measures have focused on human rights violations and 
largely disregarded economic crimes. However, in recent years, experts such as Ruben 
Carranza, have been advocating for including accountability for economic crimes within 
the ‗toolkit‘ of transitional justice mechanisms due to the way in which economic crimes 
are directly linked to impunity and the perpetuation of human rights abuses, as argued in 
Chapter II. According to Carranza, ―transitional justice can be strengthened and can 
confront impunity more effectively if it engages with accountability for corruption and 
economic crimes‖ (Carranza, 2008, p. 311). In fact, accountability for such crimes not 
only strengthens transitional justice, but it also strengthens the rule of law. The 
Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mr. Yury Fedotov, 
further emphasizes this relation between corruption and the rule of law by stating that 
―where corruption flourishes, development and the rule of law fail‖ (UNDOC, 2012, 
para 5).    
As seen in Chapter IV, economic crimes and wide-scale corruption in Lebanon did not 
end with the war. Since the political system never changed, these crimes and violations 
continued and are still taking place until this day. Corruption in all its forms, such as the 
embezzlement of public funds, bribery and nepotism, to name a few, is commonplace in 
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Lebanon. According to Gaelle Kibranian, Director of Programs at the Lebanese 
Transparency Association (LTA), resorting to power sharing agreements such as the 
Taif and the Doha agreements, rather than working on peace building and transitional 
justice, has ―provided a network of favouritism, with patronages between leaders and 
any given confession‖ (Galey, 2009, para.13).     
A number of proposals have been made for addressing corruption in Lebanon, such as 
clarifying, standardizing and streamlining state agencies‘ mandates and procedures, 
introducing ‗e-governance‘, strengthening oversight mechanisms by watchdogs, 
establishing a ‗republican ombudsman‘, greater transparency in the state budget and 
obliging politicians and public servants to declare their wealth and connections prior to 
assuming office (Leenders, 2012, p. 236). Unfortunately practically all of these measures 
require action by the parliament and/or government, making their implementation 
largely contingent on the existence of sufficient political will. 
Out of these proposals, two are particularly interesting from the point of view of this 
study as they are mostly related to strengthening or creating independent bodies to shed 
light on corrupt practices. The first of these was already brought up in Chapter IV: 
addressing the political penetration, paralysis and ineffectiveness of watchdogs such as 
the CIB and the CA, so that they would be able to perform their duties correctly. One 
way to enhance accountability for corruption and economic crimes in the public sector 
would be to empower these two institutions by making them more independent, and thus 
less prone to political interference. They could work together with an independent 
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judiciary to hold the perpetrators of economic crimes accountable before the law and 
provide much-needed checks and balances to the public sector.  
Another option, which builds on these suggestions, would be to fully implement the UN 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which Lebanon ratified in 2009. One of the 
key recommendations of the Convention is for the state to establish an independent anti-
corruption body (UNODC, 2004, Article 6), which could work in collaboration with the 
CIB and the CA.   
With regard to the political feasibility of either of these alternatives, strengthening the 
watchdog institutions or establishing an independent anti-corruption body, a study by 
Reinoud Leenders into corruption in post-war Lebanon makes the argument that the 
post-war political settlement transferred the gridlock in political decision-making down 
to the level of state institutions, encouraging each leader to establish control over the 
institution they headed control, at the expense of the bureaucratic organization of that 
institution (Leenders, 2012, pp. 224-225). He goes on to argue that only by 
strengthening the bureaucratic organization of key state institutions can the level of 
political corruption, or the allotment state, be addressed so that bureaucratic rule is no 
longer exercised selectively to the benefit of some over the others (Leenders, 2012, p. 
232). Therefore, it would seem that political will would be needed to implement either 
of the two alternatives outlined above. The very state watchdogs that were made 
ineffective by the political elite in the 2000s are unlikely to be strengthened by that same 
political elite, unless the political environment experiences a significant change. 
Similarly, establishing an independent anti-corruption body, with even more extensive 
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powers than the watchdogs, seems unlikely given that the political system remains 
unchanged.  
With regard to the impact of strengthening anti-corruption measures in Lebanon on the 
rule of law, as already stated above, corruption is generally considered to undermine the 
rule of law by eroding democratic institutions that are the basis for fair and equitable 
societies. Therefore, implementing any measures to address corruption would have a 
positive impact on the rule of law.  
As for costs, since the CIB and CA already exist and the reform suggested would focus 
on empowering them to carry out their mandates as originally envisaged, the financial 
implications of this reform would be minimal. Setting up an independent anti-corruption 
body, however, would incur considerable costs. Having said that, addressing corruption 
and the embezzlement of public funds would result in more money for the government 
in the long run. Similarly, any reforms aiming at improving the accountability of state 
institutions require time and effort, and are likely to bare fruit in the long term than the 
short term.  
Overall, while strengthening the CIB and CA would be economically feasible and likely 
to significantly improve the rule of law in Lebanon in the medium to long term, it seems 
unlikely that it would be politically acceptable. The establishment of an independent 
anti-corruption body, on the other hand, would seem even less likely, considering that it 
would require considerable financial resources in addition to political will.  
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5.1.4. Bottom-Up Approach 
Transitional justice approaches, such as official truth commissions, are usually initiated 
by the government and known for being top-down processes. Due to their top-down 
character, these processes are sometimes criticized for denigrating victims and for 
having to make ―trade-offs between truth and justice on the one hand and stability and 
pragmatic politics on the other‖ (Lundy &McGovern, 2008, p.271). Due to these 
limitations, practitioners as well as academics involved in these processes are shifting 
towards a new way of thinking, one that engages more with the grassroots level and is 
known as a bottom-up approach. The benefit of such an approach is that it integrates 
citizens in the process and gives them the feeling of ownership. According to Lundy and 
McGovern, such a process is ―conscious of the value and the need to listen to and head 
local people in order to develop locally owned processes‖ (Lundy &McGovern, 2008, 
p.271).  
Among such processes, unofficial truth projects, also known as UTPs, could be 
particularly relevant to the Lebanese case. According to Bickford, the work of the UTPs 
is quite similar to that of official truth commissions, in the sense that they target past 
crimes ―as a component of a broader strategy of accountability and justice‖ (Bickford, 
2007, p.994). UTPs can also have the same mandate and outcome as official 
commissions: a final report of the findings could be published, highlighting not only the 
atrocities committed during the war, but also making recommendations regarding the 
needs and demands of the victims (Bickford, 2007). What differentiates UTPs from 
official truth commissions is that they are led by civil society and directly work with the 
grassroots. The advantage of such an approach is that it ―represents a shift away from 
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the top-down ‗one size fits all‘ approach to a bottom up model that allows ‗voices from 
below‘ to be heard and headed‖ (Bickford, 2007, p. 995).  In situations, such as 
Lebanon, where political considerations and pressure play a role in restraining the 
establishment of an official truth commission, civil society-led processes can instigate a 
UTP initiative to do the work of an official commission. This was the case in Brazil, for 
example, where a UTP was established by civil society and its findings were published 
in a final report entitled ―Brazil: Nunca Mais‖ that was widely disseminated all over the 
country (Bickford, 2007). Other UTPs such as the Greensboro Truth and Community 
Reconciliation Project (GTCRP), not only complemented truth commissions, but 
actually served as a replacement, ―or possibly a precursor for a larger, regional or 
national effort‖ (Bickford, 2007, p. 1017).   
Going back to the Lebanese case, as demonstrated in chapter IV the Lebanese 
government initiated three commissions to look into the fate of the missing during the 
war. These initiatives failed to meet their original purposes, however, and instead left the 
families of the missing with feelings of disappointment, frustration and distrust with the 
state (CLDH, 2008).  Given this lack of trust in the Lebanese state to initiate and support 
a truth commission, one option would be for Lebanese civil society to learn from the 
Brazilian example and take the lead by establishing a bottom-up UTP. Although such a 
process would be costly and require a lot of effort, it would bring together civil society 
organizations interested in this issue to work directly with the victims, so that their 
voices and concerns could be heard. The findings and recommendations of the UTP 
could also be used as a lobbying tool by civil society to push the government to initiate 
further transitional justice processes – in essence following the relative although 
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moderate success already achieved by Lebanese civil society with regard to the issue of 
the missing and disappeared, as shown in Chapter 4.3.2. In terms of reconciliation, the 
establishment of a UTP can fill in the gap that the government left. Given that after the 
war the Lebanese government only focused on reconciliation at the highest level, a UTP 
can help by bringing conflicting sides together, as was the case with the Greensboro 
Truth and Community Reconciliation Project (GTCRP), which not only aimed at 
investigating events that took place in Greensboro on the 3
rd
 of November, 1979, but to 
also to ―promote healing and reconciliation in the Greensboro community‖ (Bickford, 
2007, p.1017).      
In terms of the criteria for examining the usefulness of initiating an unofficial truth 
commission, it would seem that in terms of political feasibility such an initiative would 
be feasible, given that it could be undertaken by civil society without any kind of formal 
decision or sanctioning by the government. In terms of its potential impact on the rule of 
law, that would depend largely on the approach taken by the UTP. If the UTP focuses 
mainly on human rights violations, it would not have a direct impact on the rule of law, 
although by finding out the truth about what was done and by whom, it would at least 
make it possible to clearly assign responsibility to a certain group or even a certain 
leader. If, on the other hand, the UTP adopts a broader scope, including also the kinds of 
economic crimes highlighted by Ruben Carranza in its scope of inquiry, it could be 
argued that an UTP could have a stronger impact on the rule of law, as it would also 
highlight corrupt practices and networks of favouritism created and sustained by the 
ruling elite. In this context it must be noted, however, that a bottom-up UTP can only try 
to bring to light various crimes and wrongdoings, it does not have the power to offer 
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compensation to victims or bring perpetrators to justice. Nevertheless, in a society like 
Lebanon, where civil society is largely free to voice opinions and advocate for issues, 
strong pressure from the bottom up could push political leaders to take transitional 
justice more seriously. 
Any unofficial truth project is likely to be costly, even if it is undertaken by civil society. 
However, as mentioned before, several civil society organizations could work together 
in such an effort to share costs and multiply efforts and, as was the case in Brazil, 
several international organizations could be interested in funding such an effort 
(Bickford, 2007). At this time, the argument could also be made that such a process 
could be used as a model for any future transitional justice effort in Syria.  
With regard to the time required to successfully implement a UTP, Bickford notes that 
the mandate of such initiatives is a short-term one; it usually takes three to five years for 
a UTP to produce results and recommendations (Bickford, 2007).  
Overall, it would seem that an unofficial, bottom-up transitional justice process would 
be much more feasible than an official one given the current political situation in the 
country. Despite its unofficial nature, such a process would also be beneficial to 
Lebanon as it would empower the victims of the war, who are still marginalized until 
this day, by seeking the truth about crimes committed during the civil war, and it would 
also bring to light the connections between those who were responsible for atrocities 
during the war and those who hold political power today, thus paving the way for greater 
accountability and transparency. By so doing, a UTP would also have a positive impact 
on the rule of law. Although the concrete, short-term impact of an unofficial process 
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would likely be quite limited, it could serve as a stepping-stone to other transitional 
justice measures, and provide citizens and civil society groups with tools for lobbying.  
5.2. Conclusions 
In countries emerging from conflicts, state institutions are weakened and the rule of law 
is not respected. In such contexts, transitional justice approaches are set up to help 
restore justice and accountability for the crimes that were committed during the war, 
thus reinforcing the rule of law and democracy. In Lebanon, however, this was not the 
case. Opening a new page and forgetting about war, along with all the injustices that 
took place without dealing with them, was the policy that was chosen by consecutive 
governments. By not dealing with its past through appropriate measures – such as 
criminal trials, truth commissions, institutional reforms and reparations – the rule of law 
in Lebanon was weakened and democracy reduced to little more than a facade. Citizens 
lost their trust in the state and in the law, corruption was rampant, especially in the 
public sector, and society remained fragmented even after the war, due to the lack of 
serious reconciliation efforts outside of the highest political levels, ignoring the needs of 
the people.   
In order to build a more democratic and less fragmented Lebanon, it would be necessary 
to strengthen the rule of law, which means that transitional justice efforts aiming at 
strengthening the rule of law would need to be implemented. However, given that the 
perpetrators of war crimes are still in power, transitional justice measures that would 
target them, such as criminal prosecutions, would not be the most plausible solution. 
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Therefore, in the case of Lebanon, transitional justice efforts should be customized to the 
political context in order to be feasible.  
Given this particular political context, this chapter outlined several possible alternatives 
for transitional justice processes that could be realistic in Lebanon. In an effort to assess 
the feasibility of these alternatives, four criteria were developed: political feasibility, 
impact on rule of law, economic viability and potential for quick wins. Assessed against 
these criteria, the study found the following initiatives as both potentially feasible and 
conducive to strengthening the rule of law: judicial reform targeting the independence of 
the judiciary; security sector reform targeting the behavior and mindsets of both the 
Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces, and; adopting a bottom-up, 
civil society-led informal truth process, which would give victims and citizens a 
possibility to feel included in efforts to heal societal wounds, thus increasing their 
ownership in eventual measures created to facilitate such healing. 
While all these potentially feasibly transitional justice measures could be expected to 
produce some tangible results in the short to medium-term, their real importance lies in 
the normative change they would bring to Lebanese politics with regard to dealing with 
the past. By addressing institutional and behavioural weaknesses and calling for the truth 
regarding past crimes, considerable pressure would be generated towards political 
parties and leaders for greater accountability. For the Lebanese people to demand 
accountability from their so-called democratically elected leaders would be the first step 
in moving towards a more just and more equal society and away from a culture of 
122 
 
kleptocracy and muhasasa which have dominated the post-war reconstruction and 
reform efforts in the country.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion 
This study has sought to make the case for the potential of transitional justice 
mechanisms in helping societies to deal with the complex challenges facing any country 
in a post-conflict environment. Based on the concept of engagement, which entails that 
acknowledging past wrongdoings is a precondition for healing, transitional justice 
mechanisms have proven to be effective at strengthening the rule of law in several 
countries during democratic transition or post-conflict recovery. The five cornerstones of 
transitional justice currently acknowledged by the UN – criminal justice, truth 
commissions, reparations, institutional reform and vetting and dismissals – are being 
complemented by new mechanisms that make it possible to address accountability not 
only for crimes against human rights but also for economic crimes. It was argued that 
such developments serve to more clearly underline the intrinsic linkages between 
transitional justice and the rule of law, both of which aim at ending impunity, 
strengthening accountability and protecting human rights. 
At the same time, the study has outlined many of the obstacles for implementing such 
mechanisms. Given that transitional justice processes are most commonly pursued by 
the national government itself, one of the main obstacles discussed was the national 
political environment and the extent to which it can provide the political will necessary 
for genuine and effective transitional justice.  
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In order to provide an in-depth analysis of the role of transitional justice in a specific 
post-conflict context, the experiences of Croatia were analyzed. It was shown that 
despite going through a divisive, identity-based conflict during the 1990s, the country 
was able to implement several transitional justice processes, including criminal justice 
mechanisms, and has since been successful in strengthening the rule of law, to the extent 
that Croatia was accepted as a member of the EU. By examining the mechanisms 
employed in Croatia and the extent to which they played a role in strengthening the rule 
of law, the study then attempted to draw lessons with regard to the mechanisms as well 
as the ―carrots and sticks‖ used to implement those mechanisms in order to see if they 
could be relevant also in the Lebanese context. 
The comparison between the Croatian and Lebanese experiences clearly showed that 
dealing with the past is never an easy path to embark on, especially not in a situation 
where a country has been through a bloody conflict riddled with human rights abuses. 
Like the Lebanese civil war, the conflict in the Balkans was largely an identity-based 
conflict and filled with human rights violations. Although Yugoslavia represents a 
situation of a country disintegrating into several smaller states, whereas Lebanon does 
not, the community-based nature of conflict in Lebanon and the Former-Yugoslav 
countries share several common elements: most importantly, each of the warring 
communities viewed its war criminals as war heroes who were engaged in an existential 
conflict. The argument was made that such a romanticized vision of the war makes it 
very hard to deal with the crimes committed and the war criminals that committed them, 
let alone engage them in public trials; it takes strong political will, as well as some 
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pressure and support from the international community, to achieve justice in such 
circumstances. Indeed, the most important lesson learned from Croatia is that strong 
political will backed by a strong civil society and a clear range of external incentives is 
central for the success of transitional justice initiatives, but also that when done 
correctly, such a process can help considerably in rebuilding respect for the rule of law. 
Unlike the Croatian experience, it was shown how the post-war settlements in Lebanon 
actually had a negative impact on accountability processes, respect for the rule of law, 
and sustainability of peace. Instead of paving the way for a reconciliation process 
between different communities, the Taif Accord served more to reaffirm 
confessionalism and legitimate the Syrian presence in Lebanon, both of which hindered 
the fragile peace that had been established. Not surprisingly, then, it was demonstrated 
how Lebanon experienced a reoccurrence of internal violence throughout its post-war 
period, culminating in the events of 2008.  
Instead of a Tribunal for war crimes, as was the case in the Former Yugoslavia, Lebanon 
instituted the Amnesty law, which denied the victims of the war access to justice and 
reinforced the culture of impunity in the country. In a perverse turn of events, the 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity during the war were not only granted amnesty 
from being brought to justice, but to make matters worse, were actually converted into 
the new political elite and allowed to get away with corruption and embezzlement in the 
post-war period as well.  
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Lebanon became a penetrated country, where regional powers fought conflicts through 
their Lebanese proxies. Instead of reforms aimed at strengthening the ability of state 
institutions to uphold the rule of law and revive the country, reforms were limited to 
revitalizing the economy and rebuilding the country and were notorious for the high 
levels of corruption involved. All of these factors contributed to a lack of trust in the 
government, further exacerbated by the state‘s lack of monopoly over the use of arms – 
the absence of efficient, accountable institutions and the unwillingness and inability of 
the government to establish its authority over all of its territory continues to undermine 
the rule of law in Lebanon. 
On the basis of these findings, the main argument of this study is that transitional justice 
efforts, aiming at strengthening the rule of law, are an essential prerequisite for building 
a more democratic and less fragmented Lebanon. However, given that those responsible 
for the gravest violent and economic crimes currently form the political elite of the 
country, classical transitional justice measures, such as criminal prosecutions, would not 
be a realistic path to take. Instead, what Lebanon needs is an innovative approach to 
transitional justice, customized to its political context.  
The argument was developed, that any effort that has a chance to succeed must be based 
on four key criteria: political feasibility, impact on rule of law, economic viability and 
potential for quick wins. Applying these criteria, the study then found three 
complementary and mutually reinforcing paths that transitional justice efforts could take 
in Lebanon: judicial reform targeting the independence of the judiciary; security sector 
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reform targeting the behavior and mindsets of both the Internal Security Forces and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces, and; adopting a bottom-up, civil society-led informal truth 
process, which would give victims and citizens a possibility to feel included in efforts to 
heal societal wounds, thus increasing their ownership in eventual measures created to 
facilitate such healing. The greatest contribution such efforts could be expected to make 
would be to put pressure on political parties and leaders for greater accountability, thus 
leading to a normative shift in Lebanese politics away from sectarian muhasasa towards 
social justice. Short of such fundamental change, in the words of Reinoud Leenders, 
―flawed state institutions and corruption are bound to flourish, just as Lebanon‘s 
political elites will reap the spoils of yet another truce.‖ (Leenders, 2012, p. 250)  
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